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Although case law plays a crucial role in the American legal system,
surprisinglylittle consensus exists on how to determine the "law" that any given
"case" generates. Lawyers, judges, and scholars regularly note the difference
between holdings and dicta and between necessary and unnecessaryparts of a
precedent-settingdecision, but such concepts have eluded coherent application
in practice. There remains considerable uncertainty about which aspects of a
judicial decision impose prospective legal obligations as a matter of stare
decisis and to what extent.
This Article develops a counterintuitive,but productive, way to conceptualize
case law: the lawmaking content of a judicial decision should be only those
decisional rules that the court states explicitly and that can be framed in the
form (IfP, then Q). Future courts would not, however, be requiredto reconcile
their decisions with otherfindings, conclusions, or reasons that the precedentsetting court offers. Although these other elements of a judicial decision could
remain influential, they would not impose binding obligations as a matter of
hierarchicalstare decisis.
This rule-centeredapproachwould allowjudicialdecisions to clarify the law
when such clarifying rules are justified and desirable, but otherwise leave the
slate clean for courts to confront unresolved questions in future cases with the
full participationoffuture litigants. As to the concern thatjudiciallyannounced
rules may sweep too broadly, this Article's approachwould leave future courts
free to develop distinguishing rules in a way that serves many of the same
purposes as the conventional understandingofhow cases may be distinguished,
but that reduces the risk of disingenuous distinctions, enhances rather than
muddies case law's clarifying benefits, and avoids conceptual and definitional
problems inherent in the currentapproach. This Article'sframeworkalso helps
to resolve a host of other difficult puzzles relating to judicial decision-making,
including the controversy surrounding unpublished opinions, the stare decisis
effect of decisions that lack a majority opinion, and how to identify and resolve
tensions within case law.
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INTRODUCTION

When a court decides a case, it can do more than simply resolve the dispute
between the litigants before it. It can also create binding law.I Although lawyers,
judges, and academics must constantly consider "case law," surprisingly little
consensus exists on how to determine the "law" that any given "case" generates. 2
This is a crucial concern with respect to decisions of the Supreme Court, which
sits atop the American judiciary and whose decisions set binding precedents for
the entire nation. 3 But it is important for other courts as well. Given the rarity of
Supreme Court review, 4 lower appellate courts create precedents that-as to
themselves and the trial courts they supervise-are no less binding than a
Supreme Court decision.5 The operation of stare decisis in our hierarchical
judicial system means that case law can create binding obligations on future
courts that are just as strong as those imposed by statutes or constitutional
provisions.
Despite its foundational role in the American legal system, case law has not
tended to attract the same level of attention as the interpretation of positive-law
sources like statutes or the Constitution. 6 Recent years, however, have witnessed
an increase in both judicial and academic interest in the subject.7 Bryan Garner

See Antonin Scalia, The Rule ofLaw as a Law ofRules, 56 U. CH. L. REv. 1175, 117677 (1989) ("In a judicial system such as ours, in which judges are bound, not only by the text
of code or Constitution, but also by the prior decisions of superior courts, and even by the
prior decisions of their own court, courts have the capacity to 'make' law.").
2 See, e.g., KARL LLEWELLYN, THE CASE LAW SYsTEM IN AMERICA 14 (Paul
Gewirtz ed.,
Michael Ansaldi trans., 1989); Max Radin, Case Law and Stare Decisis: Concerning
Prdjudizienrechtin Amerika, 33 CoLuM. L. REv. 199, 200 (1933); see also, e.g., United States
v. Chanthadara, 230 F.3d 1237, 1273 (10th Cir. 2000) ("This argument is foreclosed by
binding case law.").
See, e.g., James v. City of Boise, 136 S. Ct. 685, 686 (2016) ("The Idaho Supreme Court,
like any other state or federal court, is bound by this Court's interpretation of federal law.").
4 See, e.g., Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 899 (2009) (Roberts, C.J.,
dissenting) ("The success rate for certiorari petitions before this Court is approximately
1.1%. . . .").
See infra notes 49-52 and accompanying text.
6 See generally, e.g., PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION (1991); WILLIAM
N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION (1994); ANTONIN SCALIA, A
MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW (1997).
1 See, e.g., Randy J. Kozel, The Scope ofPrecedent, 113 MICH. L. REv. 179, 180-82 (2014);
Allison Orr Larsen, FactualPrecedents, 162 U. PA. L. REv. 59, 63 (2013); Richard M. Re,
NarrowingSupreme Court Precedentfrom Below, 104 GEO. L.J. 921, 925 (2016); Ryan C.
Williams, QuestioningMarks: PluralityDecisions and PrecedentialConstraint, 69 STAN. L.
REv. 795, 801 (2017). For older works on the subject, see generally, e.g., Michael
Abramowicz & Maxwell Steams, Defining Dicta, 57 STAN. L. REv. 953 (2005); Larry
Alexander, Constrainedby Precedent, 63 S. CAL. L. REv. 1 (1989); Michael C. Dorf, Dicta
and Article III, 142 U. PA. L. REv. 1997 (1994); Arthur L. Goodhart, Determining the Ratio
Decidendi of a Case, 40 YALE L.J. 161 (1930); Pierre N. Leval, Judging Under the
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and twelve federal judges, including now-Justice Neil Gorsuch, recently
8
published a first-of-its-kind treatise, The Law ofJudicialPrecedent.
Indeed, case law presents unique challenges compared to explicit positive
law. With a statute, for example, we can quarrel about whether we should
9
interpret it textually, purposively, or intentionally. But every part of a statute's
10
text makes law. For a judicial decision, by contrast, it is unclear which aspects
of that decision impose prospective legal obligations. Although we are familiar
with certain concepts-such as the distinction between holdings and dicta, the
notion that only necessary parts of an opinion are binding, and the ability of
future courts to distinguish earlier case law-these fundamental concepts have
eluded coherent application in practice."
This Article's focus is distinct from some of the more prominent scholarly
and judicial debates about stare decisis, case law, and judicial precedent, which
12
tend to focus on when a case could or should be overruled. The propriety of
overruling binding case law is surely an important question. But that issue is
secondary to the threshold question of whether a particular case has generated
binding law that would even need to be overruled.13 Whatever policies and
Constitution: Dicta About Dicta, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1249 (2006); Henry Paul Monaghan,
Stare Decisisand ConstitutionalAdjudication,88 COLUM. L. REV. 723 (1988); Roscoe Pound,
What ofStare Decisis?, 10 FORDHAM L. REV. 1 (1941).
8 BRYAN A. GARNER, CARLOS BEA, REBECCA WHITE BERCH, NEIL M. GORSUCH, HARRIS L.

HARTZ, NATHAN L. HECHT, BRETT M. KAVANAUGH, ALEX KOzINsKI, SANDRA L. LYNCH,
WILLIAM H. PRYOR JR., THOMAS M. REAVLEY, JEFFREY S. SurroN & DIANE P. WOOD, THE

LAW OF JUDICIAL PRECEDENT 19 (2016) ("We seek here to elucidate a constellation of
doctrines that are sorely in need of elucidation. After all, common-law lawyers and judges
habitually behave as if precedents govern their work-though they may not have closely
examined how and why this is so." (footnote omitted)).
9 See, e.g., Jonathan R. Siegel, The InexorableRadicalization of Textualism, 158 U. PA. L.

REV. 117, 131-34 (2009).
"o See Caleb Nelson, A CriticalGuide to Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 54 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 921, 931 (2013) ("Neither the authority nor the content of written law is particularly
puzzling.... [S]ubject to the need for interpretation, the law consists of the words that the
legislature enacted, and those words are law because the legislature enacted them."). This may
oversimplify things somewhat; courts have recognized, for example, that a statute'spreamble

"is not an operative part of the statute." Ass'n of Am. R.Rs. v. Costle, 562 F.2d 1310, 1316
(D.C. Cir. 1977); see also Fla. Dep't of Revenue v. Piccadilly Cafeterias, Inc., 554 U.S. 33,
47 (2008) ("[A] subchapter heading cannot substitute for the operative text of the statute.").
I See infra Part II.
12 See generally Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Stare Decisis and the Constitution: An Essay on

Constitutional Methodology, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 570 (2001); Michael J. Gerhardt, Super
Precedent,90 MINN. L. REV. 1204 (2006); Monaghan, supra note 7; Michael Stokes Paulsen,
Abrogating Stare Decisis by Statute: May Congress Remove the PrecedentialEffect ofRoe

and Casey?, 109 YALE L.J. 1535 (2000); Jeremy Waldron, StareDecisis and the Rule ofLaw:
A Layered Approach, 111 MICH. L. REV. 1 (2012).
13 See Adam N. Steinman, To Say What the Law Is: Rules, Results, and the Dangers of

Inferential Stare Decisis, 99 VA. L. REV. 1737, 1775 (2013) (distinguishing between "what
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principles should inform when a court may overrule an earlier case,1 4 it would
be helpful to have a workable framework for determining precisely what law
that earlier case has made 5-especially when one of the main purposes of stare
decisis is to clarify the content of the law and the predictability of legal rulings.16
This Article develops a counterintuitive but productive way to conceptualize
case law. Under this approach, the lawmaking content of a judicial decision
would be only those rules that the precedent-setting court sets forth in deciding
the case before it. More specifically, case law's elemental units should be
decisional principles that the court explicitly states and can be framed in the form
(If P, then Q). For example, using the Supreme Court's 2005 decision striking
down the juvenile death penalty: If a defendant was under the age of eighteen
when he committed a crime, then the Constitution forbids imposing the death
penalty for that crime.' 7 Requiring courts to state binding constraints in this
prospectively generalizable form would ensure that any such constraints will be
created only when the court makes the conscious, explicit decision to do so.' 8
Giving stare decisis effect to such rules may raise the specter of judges
behaving like legislators. ' Although the charge of "legislating from the bench"
is a common rhetorical device, it typically reveals disagreement with the
substance of a court's decision rather than with the notion that decisional

aspects ofa judicial decision ought to create binding law in the first instance" and "when that
binding law might be overruled"); see also Kozel, supra note 7, at 180-81 (distinguishing

between "[w]hether to overrule a dubious precedent" and "whether a given precedent applies
to a newly arising dispute").
The answer to that question, of course, can be different for horizontal stare decisis and
vertical stare decisis. See infra notes 81-84 and accompanying text.
15 See Steinman, supra note 13, at 1755 ("The Supreme Court, for example, imposes a
special set of 'prudential and pragmatic considerations' before it will overrule a prior holding.
Whether the Court must jump through those hoops depends on what law the earlier decision
has made." (quoting Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 883, 854 (1992))).
1 See infra notes 163-64, 220-24 and accompanying text.
7 See infra notes 131-40 and accompanying text. This Article uses the term "rules" to
describe such if-then principles, but the use of that term is not meant to invoke the distinction
between "rules" and "standards." See infra notes 142-44 and accompanying text. The
framework proposed here focuses on whether the principle is stated in a prospectively
generalizable form, not whether it tends to yield mechanically predictable answers.
18 This is not to say that courts would be obligated to declare such rules every time they
14

decide a case. Debates about the relative merits of "minimalism" and "maximalism" in
judicial decision-making may inform whether a generalizable rule is justified and desirable.
Compare, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Leaving Things Undecided, 110 HARV. L. REv. 4, 28-44
(1996), with Tara Leigh Grove, The Structural Casefor Vertical Maximalism, 95 CORNELL
L. REv. 1, 3 (2009). See also infra notes 179-81 and accompanying text. This Article's
argument is simply that a court that fails to declare a generalizable rule has made a conscious
decision not to impose prospectively binding constraints on future courts via stare decisis.
19 See infra notes 217-19 and accompanying text.
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20
principles ought to have stare decisis effect. As a practical matter, our system
depends on judicial decisions to clarify the governing rules-so much so that we
often criticize judicial decisions that fail to provide meaningful standards
21
precisely for that reason.
There are, however, legitimate concerns about institutional competence with
respect to judicially declared rules. To address those, this Article's approach
recognizes the ability of a future court-even an inferior court-to distinguish
rules set forth in earlier cases. A court may do so, however, only by explicitly
articulating its own generalizable rule. That distinguishing rule must incorporate
the distinguishing fact from the subsequent case in a way that justifies a
22
conclusion other than that dictated by the initial precedential rule. This
framework for distinguishing cases allows future courts flexibility to address
particular situations that the precedent-setting court might not have anticipated
in formulating the initial rule. Yet it also avoids arbitrary distinctions by
requiring the future court to endorse a rule for which the distinguishing fact is
relevant. Additionally it resolves some of the unanswered conceptual questions
raised by conventional assumptions about when and how to distinguish
23
precedents.
The approach developed here mitigates other problems as well. Recall, for
24
example, the aphorism that "hard cases make bad law." Where that "bad law"
is an overly broad rule that overlooks unanticipated considerations, the ability to
distinguish those rules as described above gives future courts a solution. An
additional concern, however, is that a court confronting a hard case will reach a
decision without endorsing a generalizable legal principle to support it. The case

20 See Erwin Chemerinsky, Seeing the Emperor's Clothes: Recognizing the Reality of

ConstitutionalDecision Making, 86 B.U. L. REv. 1069, 1069-70 (2006) (arguing that judging
would be better without negative rhetoric of "legislat[ing] from the bench"); Bruce G.
Peabody, Legislatingfrom the Bench: A Definition and a Defense, 11 LEwis & CLARK L. REV.

185, 203 (2007) ("In addition to objecting to how judges render decisions, critics contend that
some judicial decisions resemble lawmaking in their content or substance-in other words,
they find fault with what decisions are."). Like claims of "judicial activism," what constitutes
improper legislating from the bench seems to be largely "in the eye of the beholder." See
STEFANIE A. LINDQuIST & FRANK B. CROSS, MEASURING JuDICIAL ACTIVIsM 1 (2009).
21 See, e.g., Hall v. Florida, 134 S. Ct. 1986, 2006 (2014) (Alito, J., dissenting) ("The Court
provides no guidance. . . ."); Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 133 S. Ct. 1426, 1437 (2013)
(Ginsburg & Breyer, JJ., dissenting) ("The Court's ruling is good for this day and case only.");
NASA v. Nelson, 562 U.S. 134, 167 (2011) (Scalia, J., concurring) (arguing that majority

opinion "provides no guidance whatsoever for lower courts"); Richard M. Re, On "A Ticket

Good for One Day Only, " 16 GREEN BAG 2D 155, 161 (2013) (discussing criticisms of
decisions that "achieve attractive results, without establishing prospectively binding rules").
22 See infra Section lH.C.2.
23 See infra Sections II.B, III.C.

N. Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 400 (1904) (Holmes, J., dissenting); see also
Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604, 640 n.* (1990) (Stevens, J., concurring) ("Perhaps
the adage about hard cases making bad law should be revised to cover easy cases.").
24
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is hard precisely because a just result (or at least the result the court desires) is
difficult to square with any rule that the court is able to articulate. We fear that
this situation will make "bad law" because we assume that future courts will be
required to infer obligations from the findings, conclusions, or other reasons that
the court provided in the course of deciding that "hard case." We assume that
future courts must find ways to justify and reconcile the earlier decision even
when the precedent-setting court refrained from stating a generalizable rule in
the course of that decision. This Article's approach would reject these
assumptions. Rather, a decision would impose prospective legal obligations via
stare decisis only when the precedent-setting court explicitly and consciously
defines those obligations.
This is not to say that everything in a judicial opinion other than explicitly
stated rules should be disregarded out of hand. Other aspects of a judicial
decision-the court's findings, conclusions, or other justifications or
rationales-could still prove to be instructive, enlightening, or valuable going
forward. Every word of a judicial opinion has the potential to influence future
judicial decision-making in any number of ways and for any number of reasons.
American courts routinely cite nonbinding authority, after all, and courts in civillaw systems routinely cite prior judicial decisions despite the lack of formal stare
decisis. 25 The approach developed here would accommodate a range of different
attitudes toward how much weight to give other aspects of precedential
decisions. It would provide, however, a workable method for delineating what
is truly binding as a matter of stare decisis and what is merely persuasive or
influential.

25

See, e.g.,

JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN & ROGELIO PtREZ-PERDOMO, THE CIVIL LAW

TRADITION: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LEGAL SYSTEMS OF EUROPE AND LATIN AMERICA 47

(3d ed. 2007); Charles A. Sullivan, On Vacation, 43 Hous. L. REV. 1143, 1196-1206 (2006);
see also Steinman, supra note 13, at 1772 (examining how judges often rely on legal material
that is not binding, such as dictum or decisions from outside the "relevant jurisdiction"). Of
course, the mere fact that particular decisions or aspects of judicial decisions are cited in
subsequent judicial decisions does not establish that they are binding. For example, superior
courts cite inferior court decisions, even though such decisions are not formally binding. See
Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, FollowingLower-Court Precedent, 81 U. Cm. L. REV. 851, 852-53

(2014) (noting that the Supreme Court sometimes cites lower court cases even though
"[n]obody would argue that the Supreme Court should be bound, as a formal matter, by lowercourt precedents"). The lyrics of Bob Dylan have been cited in nearly one hundred federal
and state judicial opinions in the Westlaw database--SubterraneanHomesick Blues and The
Times They Are A-Changin' are particularly popular, although Like a Rollin' Stone bears the

distinction of the only Dylan lyric in a Supreme Court opinion-yet his lyrics are not binding
authorities in American courts. See, e.g., Sprint Commc'ns Co. v. APCC Servs., Inc., 554

U.S. 269, 301 (2008) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) ("The absence of any right to the substantive
recovery means that respondents cannot benefit from the judgment they seek and thus lack
Article III standing. 'When you got nothing, you got nothing to lose."'); Bell v. Itawamba

Cty. Sch. Bd., 799 F.3d 379, 409 (5th Cir. 2015); Robinson v. Wash. Metro. Area Transit
Auth., 774 F.3d 33, 39-40 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
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To phrase this point slightly differently, this Article's framework does not
provide a totalizing theory of how judges must consider prior judicial decisions
when adjudicating cases. Within the confines of a rule-centered approach, judges
and commentators might pursue a variety of priorities in this regard. Some might
believe a judge should act as the "faithful agent" of the precedent-setting court,
and should therefore adhere to all aspects of a judicial decision that shed light
on the precedent-setting court's preferences. 26 Others might believe that judges
must decide every case and issue independently, and that it is therefore an
abdication of the judicial role to adhere to dicta or other aspects of precedentsetting decisions that are not formally binding. 27 The framework developed here
does not seek to foreclose debate over the "best" way to decide future cases in
light of prior judicial decisions-just as there continue to be differing views of
the "best" way to interpret statutes or the Constitution. 28 Nor does this Article
purport to resolve scholarly debates over the nature of traditional "common
law." 29 Rather, it recognizes hierarchical stare decisis as a distinct phenomenon

See, e.g., Pauline T. Kim, Lower Court Discretion, 82 N.Y.U. L. REv. 383, 434 (2007)
(recognizing, but questioning, the view that "the sole duty of lower court judges is to act as
faithful agents of the Supreme Court"). Related to this view is what has been called the
"prediction model" of adjudication. See Michael C. Dorf, Predictionand the Rule ofLaw, 42
UCLA L. REv. 651, 663 (1995) (noting, but challenging, the view that judges should "strive[],
in each case, to predict what a majority of the relevant higher court would do").
26

27 See, e.g., Kozel, supra note 7, at 184 (noting the view that lower courts should "chart[]
their own course"); Leval, supra note 7, at 1250 (arguing that when judges "accept dictum

uttered in a previous opinion as if it were binding law, which governs our subsequent
adjudication," they "fail to discharge [their] responsibility to deliberate on and decide the
question which needs to be decided"); Eric J. Segall, The Constitution Means What the
Supreme Court Says It Means, 129 HARv. L. REv. F. 176, 178 (2016) (quoting retired Seventh

Circuit Judge Richard Posner as stating: "My approach with judging cases is not to worry
initially about doctrine [and] precedent ... [,] but instead, try to figure out, what is a sensible
solution to this problem, and then having found what I think is a sensible solution, without
worrying about doctrinal details, I ask 'is this blocked by some kind of authoritative precedent
of the Supreme Court'? If it is not blocked, I say fine, let's go with the common
sense . . . solution." (alteration in original) (citing Josh Blackman, Judge Posneron Judging,
Birthright Citizenship, and Precedent, JOSH BLACKMAN'S BLOG (Nov. 6, 2015),

http://joshblackman.com/blog/2015/11/06/judge-posner-on-judging-birthright-citizenshipand-precedent/ [https://perma.cc/ K5SE-FYC5])).
28 See Abbe R. Gluck, Intersystemic Statutory Interpretation:Methodology as "Law" and

the Erie Doctrine, 120 YALE L.J. 1898, 1909 (2011) ("The Court has never decided with
finality what interpretive methodology applies to federal statutes .... ); Sunstein, supranote
18, at 13 (describing competing approaches to constitutional interpretation and concluding

that "the Supreme Court has not made an official choice" among them).
29 See, e.g., Goodhart, supra note 7, at 182 (asserting that under traditional common law

reasoning, the "principle" that a case establishes "is not found in the reasons given in the
opinion" and "is not found in the rule of law set forth in the opinion").
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from the traditional common law process. 30 A method for identifying the binding
law created by any given precedential decision would provide a crucial
foundation within which normative debates about interpretive or decisionmaking philosophies might operate.
Finally, the framework proposed here helps to resolve and contextualize a
host of issues about judicial decision-making with which courts and
commentators have wrestled. These include the controversy surrounding
unpublished opinions, 31 the problem of lower courts "narrowing" superior court
precedent, 32 whether "legislative facts" have stare decisis effect, 33 the extent to
which case law may be implicitly overruled, 34 and the stare decisis effect of
decisions that lack a majority opinion. 35
This Article proceeds in five parts. Part I highlights a crucial difference
between two kinds of case law that are often lumped together: traditional
"common law" (also known as general or customary law) and hierarchical stare
decisis. It then explains why hierarchical stare decisis has become the most
significant kind of case law as a matter of contemporary practice. Part H
describes conceptual and definitional problems with how courts currently
identify the lawmaking content of a binding decision. Part III proposes a
taxonomy for the various aspects of any given judicial decision and describes
how an explicit-rules approach to hierarchical stare decisis would operate. This
Part also clarifies when such rules are sufficiently related to the actual dispute
to justify giving those rules stare decisis effect and explains how future courts
can distinguish judicially declared rules. Part IV responds to potential criticisms
of this explicit-rules framework. Part V describes how this Article's framework
clarifies other controversial issues related to judicial decision-making.
I.

Two KINDS OF CASE LAW

This Part draws an important distinction between two kinds of case law.
Section A contrasts traditional common law-also referred to as general or
customary law-and hierarchical stare decisis. Section B uses the Supreme
Court's decision in Erie RailroadCo. v. Tompkins 36 to illustrate this distinction.
30 See infra Part I (recognizing the difference between common law-or general or
customary law-and hierarchical stare decisis).
3 See, e.g., Richard B. Cappalli, The Common Law's Case Against Non-Precedential

Opinions, 76 S. CAL. L. REv. 755, 759 (2003); David C. Vladeck & Mitu Gulati, Judicial
Triage: Reflections on the Debateover Unpublished Opinions, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1667,
1671-72 (2005); Erica S. Weisgerber, Unpublished Opinions: A Convenient Means to an

UnconstitutionalEnd, 97 GEO. L.J. 621, 623 (2009).
32 See Re, supra note 7, at 926.
33 See Larsen, supra note 7, at 71-72.
34 See, e.g., Pintip Hompluem Dunn, How Judges Overrule: Speech Act Theory and the

Doctrine ofStare Decisis, 113 YALE L.J. 493, 520 (2003).
3 See, e.g., Williams, supra note 7, at 801.
36

304 U.S. 64 (1938).
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Section C highlights the fundamental tension between these two categories and
how, in general, hierarchical stare decisis has become the central focus in
contemporary practice.
Common Law v. HierarchicalStare Decisis

A.

The term "case law" can refer to different things. One kind of case law might
37
be called "the common law"-or perhaps "general law" or "customary law."
For this kind of case law, a given judicial decision does not necessarily create
law in and of itself.3 8 Rather, judicial decisions are data points that a court uses
to determine what "the common law" is. 39 Judicial decisions might not be the
only data points. This sort of common law is sometimes said to derive from more
general "practice," 40 or "CUStom,"

41

or "reason," 42 which might be ascertained

43

from "external sources" beyond judicial decisions. But this sort of common
law or general law does not give any single judicial decision dispositive power
to settle the law. Rather, "[t]he requirement [is] that judgments be consistent
with the law as a whole, not with specific earlier decisions.""
On this understanding of the common law, courts might disregard particular
decisions without needing to distinguish or overrule them formally. Courts could
simply declare that a particular decision is contrary to the practices, customs, or
patterns that give such unwritten law its content. As Blackstone put it, such a

3

See, e.g., Caleb Nelson, The Persistence of GeneralLaw, 106 COLUM. L. REv. 503, 505

(2006) ("The concept of 'general' law refers to rules that are not under the control of any
single jurisdiction, but instead reflect principles or practices common to many different
jurisdictions."); Stephen E. Sachs, Pennoyer Was Right, 95 TEX. L. REv. 1249, 1252 (2017)
(defining "general law" as "that unwritten law, including much of the English common law
and the customary law of nations, that formed the basis of the American legal system and that
continues to govern unusual corners of the system today").
38 See KENT GREENAWALT, STATUTORY AND COMMON LAW INTERPRETATION 178 (2013)

(noting traditional view that "judges did not settle what counted as law for the future" and that
"[t]heir decisions were rather evidence of a law that existed").
39 See id.
40 See William Baude & Stephen E. Sachs, The Law ofInterpretation, 130 HARV. L. REv.

1079, 1123 (2017).
41 See, e.g., William A. Fletcher, The General Common Law and Section 34 of the
JudiciaryAct of 1789: The Example of Marine Insurance, 97 HARV. L. REv. 1513, 1519
(1984) (describing the view that there was "a branch of universal commercial law, to be

governed by the customs and usages of nations").
42 See Nelson, supra note 10, at 935.
43

Id.

" NEL DUXBURY,

THE NATURE AND AuTHORITY OF PRECEDENT 49 (2008); see also

GREENAWALT, supra note 38, at 178 (noting that under traditional English common law

"[d]ecisions were portrayed as reflecting community customs or common judicial practice");
Nelson, supra note 37, at 505 (describing rules of "general law" that "emerge[] from patterns

followed across a multitude of jurisdictions," and which constitute "a distillation of general
American jurisprudence").
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decision need not be declared to be "bad law"; rather, it is "not law" because "it
is not the established custom of the realm." 4 5
The second kind of case law is hierarchical stare decisis. 46 A court is required
to follow individual decisions from courts that are superior to it according to the
hierarchical structure of the American judiciary. The rules setting out which
courts are "superior" in this hierarchy are fairly straightforward. 47 At the federal
level, every Supreme Court merits decision is binding on federal and state
courts-at least with respect to issues of federal law.4 8 Published circuit court
decisions are binding on each district court over which the circuit has appellate
jurisdiction, 49 although they are not formally binding on state courts located
within the circuit.50 Decisions by district courts do not have binding stare decisis
effect-not even within that particular district.5 1 At the state level, decisions of

45 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *70.
' See Baude & Sachs, supra note 40, at 1137 ("[S]tare decisis and common law are
separate categories.").
47 "Superior" in this sense might mean literally superior, in that the lawmaking court has
the power to review and perhaps reverse the decisions of the law-following court. But in the
horizontal stare decisis context, it might mean superior in time-the earlier decision is
binding on that same court in the future. As discussed infra notes 81-84 and accompanying
text, horizontal stare decisis is somewhat different in that most courts recognize that they can

overrule their own decisions in some circumstances.
48

See, e.g., Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958) (explaining that the Supremacy Clause

makes Supreme Court's interpretations of constitutional provisions binding on state courts);

In re Moore, No. 46, at *33 (Ala. Ct. Judiciary Sept. 30, 2016), http://judicial.alabama.gov/
judiciary/COJ46FinalJudgment 09302016.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q2W6-3U6P] ("Cooper
held that states are bound by the decisions of the United States Supreme Court, even when a
state has not been a party to the case that generatedthe decision."). Of course, there are some
Supreme Court rulings-such as denials of certiorari-that do not have precedential effect.
See STEPHENM. SHAPIRO ET AL., SUPREME COURT PRACTICE 336 (10th ed. 2013); Peter Linzer,
The Meaning of CertiorariDenials, 79 COLUM. L. REv. 1227, 1228-29 (1979).
49 See, e.g., Langston v. Carraway Methodist Hosps. of Ala., Inc., 840 F. Supp. 854, 864
n.10 (N.D. Ala. 1993) ("It is the law of the Eleventh Circuit that binds this court and, where
there is controlling precedent from the circuit, this court is bound to follow it."); Agola v.

Hagner, 556 F. Supp. 296, 299 (E.D.N.Y. 1982) ("While we agree with the conclusion in [an
Eighth Circuit decision], we are, nonetheless, bound by the decisions of the Second Circuit.").
5o See, e.g., Feis v. King Cty. Sheriff's Dep't, 267 P.3d 1022, 1034 (Wash. Ct. App. 2011)
("Although the federal district courts in the Ninth Circuit may be bound to follow Ninth
Circuit precedent pursuant to the doctrine of stare decisis, this court is not obligated to follow
Ninth Circuit precedent .... ).

s See Camreta v. Greene, 563 U.S. 692, 709 n.7 (2011) ("A decision of a federal district
court judge is not binding precedent in either a different judicial district, the same judicial
district, or even upon the same judge in a different case." (quoting 18 JAMES WM. MOORE ET
AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 134.02[1][d] (3d ed. 2011))).
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52
the state's highest court will generally be binding on all of that state's courts.
There are some interesting differences, however, in how state judicial systems
53
handle the stare decisis effect of intermediate state appellate court decisions.
Of course, questions may arise about how to interpret any given decision from
a superior court. And courts may need to reconcile binding decisions that seem
to point in different directions. 54 But courts face similar challenges with regard
55
to statutes or even constitutional provisions. Hierarchical stare decisis means
that decisions by superior courts are binding law, just as statutes and
constitutional provisions are binding law.
To further highlight the differences between these two kinds of case law, one
might think in terms of inputs and outputs. With respect to common law or
general law (the first category), individual judicial decisions do not themselves
create binding law. They are simply empirical inputs that courts may consider
to determine the general practices, customs, or patterns that give the common
law its content. 56 With respect to hierarchical stare decisis (the second category),
every judicial decision made by a superior court is a lawmaking output-which
has the power to bind future courts just like a statute or constitutional provision.
For the remainder of this Article, I am going to refer to the first type of case
law as "common law," but I do so with some trepidation. Courts and
commentators often use the term "common law" to refer to both kinds of case
law regardless of whether that case law is binding because of hierarchical stare

52

See, e.g., Nogueira v. Comm'r of Corr., 149 A.3d 983, 984 n.1 (Conn. App.

Ct. 2016)

("As an intermediate appellate court, we, of course, are bound by the decisions of our Supreme

Court.").
5 See, e.g., Grisby v. Herzog, 362 P.3d 763, 774 (Wash. Ct. App. 2015) ("When one of
our panels concludes that a previous Court of Appeals decision used a faulty legal analysis or
has been undermined by some new development in the law, the opinion will usually state
simply that the panel 'disagrees with,' 'departs from,' or 'declines to follow' the other
opinion.").
54 See, e.g., In re Emp't Discrimination Litig., 198 F.3d 1305, 1319 (11th Cir. 1999)
("Where precedent binding upon this court cannot be reconciled with a subsequent Supreme

Court decision, we must defer to the Supreme Court."); Torres v. Edwards, No. 97-cv-00655,
1998 WL 42573, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 4, 1998) (attempting "to reconcile the various
formulations in the Supreme Court decisions by relating the gravity of the interest asserted to
the degree of closure requested"); Loftus v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., 843 F. Supp. 981, 984 (E.D.
Pa. 1994) ("Though the Court must attempt to reconcile where possible a conflict between
the decisions of the Supreme Court and the Third Circuit, it is bound to recognize when a
Third Circuit precedent has been squarely overruled by an opinion of the Supreme Court."
(citations omitted)).
5

See, e.g., ANToNIN ScALiA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION

OF LEGAL TExTS 183-85 (2012) (describing "general/specific canon" of statutory
interpretation, which provides that when two statutory provisions conflict, "specific provision
is treated as an exception to the general rule"); id. at 185 (describing interpretive canon that
later-enacted statute overrides earlier statute).
56 See supra notes 37-44 and accompanying text.
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decisis or because it reflects the sort of practices, customs, or patterns to which
"the common law" sometimes refers.57
B.

An Illustration: Swift, Erie, and FederalCommon Law

The Supreme Court's decision in Erie illustrates the distinction between these
two kinds of case law. Harry Tompkins sued Erie Railroad in federal court based
on diversity jurisdiction, alleging that he had been struck by an open door
projecting from one of the cars while he was walking beside railroad tracks in
northeastern Pennsylvania.58 The railroad company argued that its liability was
governed by Pennsylvania law and that, according to decisions of the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court, Tompkins was a trespasser who could recover
only if Erie Railroad had acted with wanton or willful negligence (not mere
negligence). 59 Tompkins-invoking the Supreme Court's decision a century
earlier in Swift v. Tyson 60-argued that a federal court was not bound by the
decisions of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.61 Rather, Swift allowed a federal
court to determine the standard of care based on its independent assessment of
"the common law." 62
In an opinion written by Justice Louis Brandeis, the Supreme Court overruled
Swift. 6 3 Borrowing from Justice Stephen Johnson Field, Justice Brandeis
rejected the notion that federal courts had the power to ascertain "the general
law of the country" and thereby to "brush[] aside the law of a State in conflict
with their views." 64 And borrowing from Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Justice
Brandeis wrote that "[t]he common law so far as it is enforced in a State, whether
called common law or not, is not the common law generally but the law of that
State existing by the authority of that State"; therefore, "the voice adopted by
the State as its own (whether it be of its Legislature or of its Supreme Court)

57 One interesting example of this is a concurring opinion by Justice Samuel Alito
discussing the duress defense to criminal liability. See Dixon v. United States, 548 U.S. 1, 1920 (2006) (Alito, J., concurring). At one point, he refers to duress as an "established defense
at common law" (citing Blackstone, no less). Id. at 19 (citing 4 WLLIAM BLACKSTONE,
CoMMENTAlrEs *30). Sentences later, Justice Alito criticizes Justice Stephen Breyer's
proposal on the basis that it would bind future courts by determining, "in the manner of a
common-law court," what the best rule is. Id. at 20.
58

Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 69 (1938).

' Id. at 70.

6 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1, 18 (1842).
61 See Erie, 304 U.S. at 70.
62 See id. at 71 ("[Swifit] held that federal courts exercising jurisdiction on the ground
of

diversity of citizenship need not, in matters of general jurisprudence, apply the unwritten law

of the State as declared by its highest court; that they are free to exercise an independent
judgment as to what the common law of the State is-or should be .....
6

See id. at 79-80.

* Id. at 78 (quoting Balt. & Ohio R.R. Co. v. Baugh, 149 U.S. 368, 401 (1893) (Field, J.,
dissenting)).
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should utter the last word." 65 On this point, Justice Brandeis might also have
included one of Justice Holmes's other famous quips: "The common law is not
a brooding omnipresence in the sky but the articulate voice of some sovereign
or quasi-sovereign that can be identified ....
67
Although the ultimate upshot of Erie had to do with judicial federalism, the
jurisprudential basis for Erie highlights the difference between the two kinds of
case law described in the previous Section. The "common law" is Justice
Holmes's "brooding omnipresence" 68-the "transcendental body of law outside
of any particular State." 69 Hierarchical stare decisis, by contrast, is why the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court's adoption of a particular standard of care was "the
70
law of that State existing by the authority of that State," binding on future
71
courts within Pennsylvania.
How HierarchicalStare Decisis (Mostly) Conqueredthe Common Law

C.

Although the two kinds of case law described here potentially overlap-and
both might refer as a general matter to interstitial judicial lawmaking-there is
a tension that makes it hard for them to coexist within a particular judicial
system. In the years before Erie, one lawyer observed that "the acceptance and
application of the common-law principle of the authority of precedent in a given
jurisdiction eats up and destroys the theory that the decisions of the court are
only evidence of the law." 72 On this account, "[t]he two principles are entirely
73
inconsistent; if you accept one you cannot have the other."

Id. at 79 (emphasis added) (quoting Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown
& Yellow Taxicab & Transfer Co., 276 U.S. 518, 534-35 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting)).
66 S. Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 222 (1917) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
65

67 See generally, e.g., EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., BRANDEIS AND THE PROGRESSIVE
CONsTrruTION: ERiE, THE JUDICIAL POWER, AND THE POLITICS OF THE FEDERAL COURTS IN
TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA 211-46 (2000); Martha A. Field, Sources ofLaw: The Scope

of Federal Common Law, 99 HARv. L. REv. 881 (1986); Michael Steven Green, Erie's
Suppressed Premise, 95 MINN. L. REv. 1111 (2011); Suzanna Sherry, Overruling Erie:
Nationwide Class Actions andNationalCommon Law, 156 U. PA. L. REv. 2135 (2008); Adam
N. Steinman, What Is the Erie Doctrine? (and What Does It Mean for the Contemporary

Politics ofJudicialFederalism?), 84 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 245, 255-58 (2008).
68 S. Pac., 244 U.S. at 222 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
69 Erie, 304 U.S. at 79 (1938) (quoting Black & White, 276 U.S. at 534 (Holmes, J.,
dissenting)).
70 Id.

71 In Erie, the parties disputed whether the Pennsylvania Supreme Court had, in fact,
endorsed this standard, and the Supreme Court remanded for the lower federal court to resolve
that question. See id. at 80.
72 Herbert Pope, The English Common Law in the United States, 24 HARV. L. REv. 6, 12

(1910).
7 Id.

2017]

CASE LA W

1961

The conflict is this: Once the highest court in a judicial system declares the
content of "the common law," that content becomes binding on other courts in
that system due to hierarchical stare decisis. 74 That binding decision cannot
conclusively determine the common law-as discussed above, that is not how
the common law works. 75 But it can have the same practical effect if the decision
is one that all courts in that judicial system must follow. 76
In this way, the lawmaking power of a judicial decision that is binding as a
matter of stare decisis can, for all intents and purposes, override the inquiry into
the practices, customs, and patterns by which the common law is traditionally
determined. Once the Pennsylvania Supreme Court declares "the common law"
with respect to the duty of care owed to trespassers, its decision becomes binding
going forward, effectively preventing Pennsylvania courts from making an
independent, empirical assessment of what the practices, customs, and patterns
actually are. This reality supports what was initially the outlier view of Justices
Field and Holmes and which, over the course of several decades, became the
prevailing view declared by Justice Brandeis in Erie.77
This is not to say that common law forms of argument are irrelevant. Judges
may take comfort in knowing that there is (in a loose sense) "precedent" for a
given decision, even if they recognize that they are not formally bound by such
precedent.78 In many instances, a thoughtful consideration of the existing

7 See, e.g., Coon v. Med. Ctr., Inc., 797 S.E.2d 828, 829, 834 (Ga. 2017) (deciding that
Georgia courts are bound to follow "the common law as determined by Georgia's courts" and
that, if the Georgia Supreme Court changes its view of the common law, that new decision
"would apply in future Georgia cases"). With respect to the particular conflict-of-laws
question presented in Coon, the decision had elements of a pre-Erie mindset because it held
that "where a claim in a Georgia lawsuit is governed by the common law, and the common
law is also in force in the other state [where the injury occurred], as it is in Alabama, the
common law as determined by Georgia's courts will control." Id. at 829. This notion reflects
pre-Eriejurisprudence in the sense that choosing Alabama law under the lex loci delicti (law
of the place where the tort was committed) choice-of-law rule did not entail following
Alabama courts' definition of the common law. But it reflects post-Erie jurisprudence in the
sense that Georgia courts are bound to apply "the common law" as defined by the Georgia
courts. One might view cases like Coon as showing how the common law and stare decisis
can coexist. As a choice-of-law matter, the court follows "the common law," but the state
supreme court's understanding of the common law is prospectively binding. Even through
this lens, however, hierarchical stare decisis effectively overrides future courts' independent
inquiry into the content of the common law.
" See supra notes 37-45 and accompanying text.
76 See GREENAWALT, supra note 38, at 183 ("The modern premise is that common law
decisions and opinions represent more than mere evidence of the law.. . . [N]o one doubts
that particular judicial decisions do themselves carry significant authority.").
n See supra Section I.B.
78 See, e.g., MERRYMAN & PtREz-PERDOMO, supra note 25, at 47 ("Everybody knows that
civil law courts do use precedents."); Steinman, supranote 13, at 1772 (explaining how courts
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practices, customs, and patterns may point the way toward the best resolution of
a particular case or a particular legal issue.
In contemporary litigation, however, hierarchical stare decisis is a trump card.
When the Supreme Court decides a case, for example, the question to which
lower courts and litigants turn is not where that case falls in the broader mosaic
of the "common law." Rather, the operating assumption is that this is a superior
court speaking, and other courts within its precedential orbit are bound to follow
the superior court's decision.79 The debate going forward is over what it means
0
to follow that case as a matter of stare decisis.s
II.

PROBLEMS WITH How WE IDENTIFY CASE LAW

This Part identifies conceptual and definitional problems with current
approaches to determining the stare decisis effect of judicial decisions. The
critique is not that we define the lawmaking effect of judicial decisions too
broadly or too narrowly. Rather, it is that the contemporary understanding of
stare decisis fails to provide satisfactory answers to crucial threshold questions:
What are the fundamental elements of a case? How do we identify the various
parts of a judicial decision, so that we may then conclude that parts A and C
create binding obligations as a matter of stare decisis, but parts B and D do not?
And how much freedom do future courts have to work around ostensibly binding
aspects of a judicial decision?
To be clear, the focus of this Article is not on the question of when a particular
case can or should be overruled. Accordingly, the analysis here does not
distinguish between horizontal stare decisis (e.g., the Supreme Court's handling
of its own precedent) and vertical stare decisis (e.g., lower courts' handling of
Supreme Court precedent or district courts' handling of circuit court precedent).
in civil law systems-which lack a formal doctrine of stare decisis-regularly rely on
previous judicial decisions).
7 See, e.g., Navarro v. Encino Motorcars, LLC, 845 F.3d 925, 935 (9th Cir. 2017) ("[We
may not disregard the Court's existing, binding precedent.").
so Justices on the Supreme Court are keenly aware of this, as illustrated by an exchange
between Justice Breyer and counsel for the plaintiffs at oral argument in Hernandez v. Mesa,
137 S. Ct. 2003 (2017). Hernandez arose out of "a tragic cross-border incident in which a
United States Border Patrol agent standing on United States soil shot and killed a Mexican
national standing on Mexican soil." Id. at 2004. During oral argument, plaintiffs' counsel
resisted taking a position on a variety of other hypotheticals where actions taken by
government officials in the United States cause injury abroad. See, e.g., Oral Argument at 4,
Hernandez v. Mesa, 137 S. Ct. 2003 (2017) (No. 15-118) (Chief Justice Roberts asking "how
do you analyze the case of a drone strike in Iraq where the plane in [sic] piloted from
Nevada"). Justice Breyer explained that it was important to consider such scenarios because
the Court's ultimate decision would have precedential impact beyond its mere resolution of
this case: "We [will] write some words. And those words you're delighted with because you
win ... The problem is other people will read those words .... So what are the words that
we write that enable you to win, which is what you want, and that avoid confusion,

uncertainty, or decide these other cases the proper way?" Id. at 7-8.
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The two are different, to be sure, in terms of the ability to overturn a precedent.
Horizontal stare decisis permits a court to overturn its own precedents (in
particular circumstances).8 1 Vertical stare decisis does not allow a lower court
to overturn a superior court's precedents. 82 That lower courts cannot overrule a
higher court decision, however, does not mean they must attribute broader
lawmaking content to higher court decisions.83 And the ability to identify an
earlier decision's lawmaking content is important for horizontal stare decisis as
well. Whether a court must address the sort of "prudential and pragmatic
considerations" that justify overruling a prior decision depends on what law the
earlier decision made. 84
With that caveat, this Part describes the prevailing methods for determining
which parts of a "case" actually make "law" and highlights the uncertainty and
inconsistency inherent in these methods. Section A critiques conventional

" See Planned Parenthood 9f Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854 (1992) ("[I]t is common
wisdom that the rule of stare decisis is not an 'inexorable command. . . ."' (quoting Bumet
v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 405-11 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting))). The
federal circuit courts can also overrule their own precedents, although it varies from circuit to
circuit whether an en banc sitting is required to do so. See, e.g., Steinman, supra note 13, at
1774 n.221 (comparing different circuits' approaches to this question).
82 See, e.g., Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 237 (1997) (noting that only the Supreme
Court has the "prerogative of overruling its own decisions" (quoting Rodriguez de Quijas v.
Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 484 (1989))); Kozel, supra note 7, at 203 ("[T]he
American federal system . . treat[s] vertical precedent as absolutely binding."); Steinman,
supra note 13, at 1774 ("Vertical stare decisis does not permit overruling; a lower federal
court cannot overrule a Supreme Court decision, and a federal district court cannot overrule a
decision by its own court of appeals." (footnote omitted)).
83 One might plausibly argue that courts should view the lawmaking content of a decision
differently depending on the relationship of that court to the precedent-setting decision. See,
e.g., Kozel, supra note 7, at 211 (observing that one may "relax" the "assumption" that "the
scope of precedent is defined identically in the vertical and horizontal contexts"). Under the
framework proposed here, the binding law generated by any judicial decision would be the
same in both the horizontal and vertical contexts-with the only difference being the ability
of courts in the context of horizontal stare decisis to overrule their own earlier decisions. This
Article's framework would not necessarily foreclose the view that a court ought to pay special
heed to aspects of superior court decisions that would not qualify as formally binding-based,
for example, on a "faithful agent[]" theory or a "prediction model." See supra note 26. That
view finds support in the attitude expressed by some lower courts that the Supreme Court's
"considered dicta" is "almost" as binding as its "outright holdings." McCoy v. Mass. Inst. of
Tech., 950 F.2d 13, 19 (1st Cir. 1991). But this Article's framework would not necessarily
endorse that view either. See supranote 27 (describing the view that judge who accepts dictum
from a previous decision as if it were binding law fails to discharge her responsibility to
deliberate on and decide the immediate case independently). Rather, these areas of
disagreement would be understood as debates over the best way to decide cases within the
space left by aspects of case law that are truly binding as a matter of stare decisis. See supra

notes 26-28 and accompanying text.
84 Casey, 505 U.S. at 854-55.
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accounts of the difference between holdings and dicta, as well as the notion that
stare decisis applies only to portions of a decision that are "necessary" to the
court's ruling. Section B addresses other concerns, including the notion that stare
decisis creates a "facts-plus-outcome" 8 5 obligation on future courts, and the lack
of conceptual clarity regarding what it means to "distinguish" an ostensibly
binding precedent.
A.

Holdings, Dicta, and Necessity

Perhaps the most common framework for identifying the binding aspects of a
judicial decision is the distinction between "holdings" and "dicta." 86 As the
Supreme Court has explained: "It is to the holdings of our cases, rather than their
dicta, that we must attend . .. . "87 Although there is a loose sense that dicta are
statements that do not support the court's ultimate ruling in the case-and
holdings are statements that do support the court's ultimate ruling-this is a
difficult line to draw.88
Another way courts and commentators have tried to identify which aspects of
a judicial opinion are binding on future courts is by inquiring which parts of the
opinion are necessary to the decision. That is, future courts are bound by "those
portions of the opinion necessary to" the court's result.89 But what does
"necessary" mean in this context? The Court has indicated that necessary
portions include the "rationale upon which the Court based the results of its
earlier decisions" 90 as well as "explications of the governing rules of law." 91

85

See Dorf, supra note 7, at 2012.

86

See, e.g., United States v. Crawley, 837 F.2d 291, 292 (7th Cir. 1988) ("What is at stake

in distinguishing holding from dictum is that a dictum is not authoritative. It is the part of an

&

opinion that a later court, even if it is an inferior court, is free to reject."); Abramowicz
Stearns, supra note 7, at 957 (stating that "holdings in prior cases are at least presumptively
binding-while dicta is not"); Kent Greenawalt, Reflections on Holding and Dictum, 39 J.

LEGAL EDUC. 431, 432 (1989) ("The distinction between holding and dictum concerns what
the first case establishes, as opposed to what its opinion may say that is not established.");
Leval, supra note 7, at 1257 ("To say that a court's statement is a dictum is to say that the

statement is not the holding. Holding and dictum are generally thought of as mutually
exclusive categories.").
8 Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 379 (1994).
88 See Leval, supra note 7, at 1258 ("There is no line demarcating a clear boundary
between holding and dictum.").
89 Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 67 (1996); ObiterDictum, BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (defining "obiter dictum" as "[a] judicial comment made while
delivering a judicial opinion, but one that is unnecessary to the decision in the case and

therefore not precedential"); GARNER ET AL., supra note 8, at 53 (noting need to "determine
which aspects ofthe appellate court's written opinion were necessary to its ultimate decision,
thereby rendering those parts of the opinion its holdings").
90 Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 66-67.

" Id. at 67 (quoting Cty. of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 668 (1989) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part)).
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Yet the Court has also observed (per Chief Justice John Marshall) that a
court's "general expressions . .. are to be taken in connection with the case in
which those expressions are used" and that "[i]f they go beyond the case,
they ... ought not to control the judgment in a subsequent suit." 92 By definition,
however, any generalizable "rule[]" 93 or "rationale" 94 Will "go beyond the
case"9 5 in which it is declared. 96 In other words, such a rule or rationale is never
strictly "necessary," because any case might conceivably be decided based
purely on the totality of its circumstances-without endorsing a broader rule or
rationale. 97
Assuming that stare decisis applies to portions of an opinion that are broader
than logically "necessary" but sufficiently "necessary" to the court's actual
reasoning, must we distinguish between different categories of ostensibly
"necessary" portions? For example, judges and scholars have disagreed about
whether so-called "legislative facts"-factual propositions on which a court
relies to support its application or interpretation of the law-ought to have
binding force as a matter of stare decisis. 98 Are future courts bound to accept

92 Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat) 264, 399 (1821) (emphasis added); see also
Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 626 (1935) (distinguishing "the narrow
point actually decided" in an earlier case from "expressions" made "[i]n the course of the
opinion of the court" that were "beyond the point involved and, therefore, do not come within
the rule of stare decisis"). For a discussion of the Court's approach to stare decisis in
Humphrey's Executor, see Dorf, supra note 7, at 2018-24.
93 Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 66.
94 Id. at 67 (quoting Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 668 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment

in part and dissenting in part)).
" Cohens, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat) at 399.
96 See Alexander, supra note 7, at 25 ("Every rule, by virtue of being a rule, decides issues
that are broader than the particular facts of the cases in which they are announced." (emphasis
omitted)).
97 See DUXBURY, supra note 44, at 78 ("Necessity tests, however formulated, provide only
inadequate conceptions of the ratio decidendi.").

9 See Larsen, supra note 7, at 71 (criticizing notion that stare decisis binds future courts
to accept truth of such legislative facts). In a Seventh Circuit decision on the constitutionality

of Wisconsin's voter identification law, Judge Frank Easterbrook and Judge Richard Posner
split on precisely this issue. Judge Easterbrook reasoned that "whether a photo ID requirement
promotes public confidence in the electoral system is a 'legislative fact'-a proposition about
the state of the world, as opposed to a proposition about these litigants or about a single state."

Frank v. Walker, 768 F.3d 744, 750 (7th Cir. 2014). The Seventh Circuit was bound to accept
that a photo ID requirement did promote public confidence in elections because "[o]n matters
of legislative fact, courts accept the findings of legislatures and judges of the lower courts
must accept findings by the Supreme Court." Id. Dissenting from the denial of rehearing en
banc, Judge Posner responded that Easterbrook's approach "conjures up a fact-free cocoon."

Frank v. Walker, 773 F.3d 783, 795 (7th Cir. 2014) (Posner, J., dissenting from denial of
rehearing en banc). Posner asked: "If the Supreme Court once thought that requiring photo
identification increases public confidence in elections, and experience and academic study

1966
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such legislative facts insofar as they are part of the "rationale upon which the
99
Court based the results of its earlier decisions"? Or does stare decisis extend
only to the legal ruling that those legislative facts are invoked to support?
However one evaluates "necessity" in this context, it is unclear how that
concept intersects with the holding-dicta distinction. Presumably "portions of
00
If they
the opinion necessary to" the court's opinion are not merely dicta.
were, such necessary portions would not be binding. Yet courts sometimes
suggest that any part of an opinion that extends beyond "precisely . . . the facts
of each case" is dictum.10' This view has invited some to draw a distinction
02
between "obiter dictum" and "judicial dictum."l Obiter dictum "is in the nature
of a peripheral, off-the-cuff judicial remark" and is not binding as a matter of
stare decisis. 0 3 Judicial dictum is "an opinion by a court on a question that is
directly involved, briefed, and argued by counsel ... but that is not essential to
0
the decision."'1' Judicial dictum is sometimes said to be "binding precedent"1
and sometimes said to be "not binding even if it may later be accorded some
weight." 06

since shows that the Court was mistaken, do we do a favor to the Court .. . by making the
mistake a premise of our decision?" Id.
9 Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 66-67.
100 Id. at 67.
101 McCoy v. Mass. Inst. of Tech., 950 F.2d 13, 19 (1st Cir. 1991) (arguing that lower
courts should be "bound by the Supreme Court's considered dicta almost as firmly as by the
Court's outright holdings" because "[i]f lower courts felt free to limit Supreme Court opinions
precisely to the facts of each case, then our system of jurisprudence would be in shambles,
with litigants, lawyers, and legislatures left to grope aimlessly for some semblance of reliable
guidance" (emphasis added)).
102 GARNER ET AL., supra note 8, at 62 (emphasis omitted).
103

id.
10 Id. (quoting JudicialDictum, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 89).
105 Id. at 63 (citing United States v. Johnson, 256 F.3d 895, 914 (9th Cir. 2001)); id. at 64
(citing United States v. Oshatz, 912 F.2d 534, 540 (2d Cir. 1990)).
'0 Id. at 62 (citing JudicialDictum, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 89). Further
confusion arises from the fact that courts and commentators sometimes suggest that certain
parts of an opinion might be almost, but not fully, binding as a matter of stare decisis. See,
e.g., McCoy, 950 F.2d at 19 ("We think that federal appellate courts are bound by the Supreme
Court's considered dicta almost as firmly as by the Court's outright holdings, particularly
when, as here, a dictum is of recent vintage and not enfeebled by any subsequent statement."
(emphasis added)); see also, e.g., LaPierre v. City of Lawrence, 819 F.3d 558, 563-64 (1st
Cir. 2016) ("And we have made clear that we 'are bound by the Supreme Court's considered
dicta almost as firmly as by the Court's outright holdings."' (quoting Cuevas v. United States,
778 F.3d 267, 272-73 (1st Cir. 2015))). This Article's focus, however, is on identifying those
aspects of prior decisions that are truly binding on future courts. As long as a court retains the
ability to reject some aspect of a prior judicial decision (as lower courts would when they
purport to be "almost" rather than completely bound by Supreme Court dicta), that aspect
would fall on the nonbinding side of the line for purposes of this project. As discussed supra
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For one example of the confusion on this issue, consider how Justice John
Paul Stevens's concurring opinion in Carey v. Musladinl07 addressed the
Supreme Court's decision in Strickland v. Washington.0 8 Strickland was a
landmark case that articulated the test for ineffective assistance of counsel
claims.1 09 Justice Stevens described Strickland's "ultimate holding" as simply
that the Court "rejected the petitioner's ineffective-assistance claim."' 10 It was
Strickland's "reasoning ... (including carefully considered dicta)" that "set
forth the standards for evaluating such claims.""' He argued, therefore, that
courts should not "discount the importance of such guidance on the ground that
it may not have been strictly necessary as an explanation of the Court's specific
holding in the case."I 12 As Justice Stevens described it, Strickland's declaration
of the "standards" governing ineffective-assistance claims was neither the
Court's "ultimate holding" nor "strictly necessary as an explanation of the
Court's specific holding in the case"; yet those standards must still be
followed.

113

note 25, the mere fact that courts cite certain authorities does not mean that those authorities
are binding. See also Kozel, supra note 7, at 186 ("A judicial proposition that is treated as
persuasive carries no force beyond that which might accrue to an amicus curiae brief or a
scholarly treatise.").
107 549 U.S. 70, 78 (2006) (Stevens, J., concurring) ("While our ultimate holding rejected
the petitioner's ineffective-assistance claim, the reasoning in our opinion (including carefully
considered dicta) set forth the standards for evaluating such claims that have been accepted
as 'clearly established law' for over 20 years.").
1 466 U.S. 668, 706 (1984) (emphasizing that although "the Court reject[ed] the
ineffective-assistance claim in this case," the "standards announced today will go far towards
assisting lower federal courts and state courts in discharging their constitutional duty to ensure
that every criminal defendant receives the effective assistance of counsel guaranteed by the

Sixth Amendment").
'09 See id. at 687 (describing the "two components" that govern a "convicted defendant's
claim that counsel's assistance was so defective as to require reversal of a conviction or death

sentence"). Indeed, Strickland has proven to be so influential that it is the sixth most cited
decision in the history of the Supreme Court. See Adam N. Steinman, The Rise and Fall of

PlausibilityPleading,69 VAND. L. REV. 333, 390 (2016) (listing hundred most cited Supreme
Court decisions in terms of citations by federal courts).
110 Carey, 549 U.S. at 78 (Stevens, J., concurring).
11

Id.

112 Id. at 79.

113 See id. at 78-79 ("Virtually every one of the Court's opinions announcing a new
application of a constitutional principle contains some explanatory language that is intended
to provide guidance to lawyers and judges in future cases."). Indeed, Justice Stevens argued
in Carey that Strickland should have an even stronger effect than ordinary stare decisis. He

urged that Strickland's reasoning--even though not "strictly necessary" to the case's
outcome-still created "clearly established law" that justified federal habeas relief under
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act's deferential standard for reviewing a state

court's rejection of a defendant's federal claims. Id.

1968
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Facts, Outcomes, and Distinctions

Determining the law-generating content of a judicial decision presents other
challenges as well. Consider the conventional assumption that stare decisis at
least compels future courts to decide cases consistently with the ultimate result
114
That is, when
that the earlier court reached in the precedent-setting case.
future courts are confronted with the same facts as those in the precedent-setting
case, they must reach the same result that was reached in the precedent-setting
case. Professor Michael Dorf has described this as a "facts-plus-outcome"
obligation. 115
Conceptually, even this seemingly modest notion is problematic. First of all,
how do future courts assess which "facts" from the precedent-setting case
provide the point of comparison for generating the "outcome"? Is it only facts
that are explicitly stated in the precedent-setting opinion? Or may future courts
attribute facts that appear elsewhere in the record of the precedent-setting caseregardless of whether those facts were emphasized or even mentioned in the
precedent-setting opinion? May future courts do their own research and declare
that facts that had never been part of the broader record in the precedent-setting
case are relevant?
Second, what constraints, if any, exist regarding whether the facts of the
future case are similar enough to the precedent-setting case that the future court
must reach the same result? Unless such constraints exist, a future court could
avoid the ostensibly binding outcome of the precedent-setting case simply by
noting that the plaintiff in the later case had a different first name or had filed
her case on a different day of the week.1 6 Yet an opinion by Justice Antonin
Scalia (one of the final opinions he authored) recognized quite candidly that
courts may avoid the binding consequence of an earlier decision by pointing to
factual differences that are "accurate-in-fact" but "inconsequential-in-

114 See Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 67 (1996) ("When an opinion issues
for the Court, it is not only the result . .. by which we are bound." (emphasis added));
18 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE §134.03[1] (3d ed. 2016) ("At a

minimum, a lower court is required to render decisions that are consistent with the results of
prior decisions of a higher court to which the lower court owes allegiance."); Steinman, supra
note 13, at 1783-84 ("Even those who argue in favor of rule-based stare decisis (so-called
legislative holdings) typically argue that there should also be a duty to reconcile results.").
"1 Dorf, supra note 7, at 2012. To be clear, Professor Dorf used the term to describe an
approach where stare decisis would apply only to the facts and ultimate outcome of the earlier
decision, and would not require future courts to follow any broader principles stated in the
precedent-setting decisions. See id. at 2011-12. But it is commonly assumed that stare decisis
should at least include an obligation to decide future cases consistently with the ultimate
results reached in earlier cases. See supra note 114.
116 See Steinman, supra note 13, at 1766 n.181.
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principle."' 17 If one accepts this view, it is hard to imagine any case that would
ever present exactly the same facts as an earlier one, which would effectively
render meaningless the facts-plus-outcome obligation.
Third, how much leeway do future courts have when it comes to
characterizing the ultimate "outcome" of the earlier decision for purposes of a
"facts-plus-outcome" obligation? Must they accept the precise legal basis that
the precedent-setting court gave for the outcome? Or is a future court able to
formulate other grounds for the earlier decision-as long as the same side that
prevailed would also prevail based on that alternative ground? 18 Suppose, for
example, a precedent-setting court ruled against the plaintiff because she failed
to establish a violation of her constitutional rights. Could a future court conclude
that the same outcome ("Plaintiff loses") could have been justified by the
plaintiffs failure to comply with the governing statute of limitations? If so, the
court could effectively free itself from an otherwise binding decision on the
scope of the constitutional right at issue. Or suppose a court found that personal
jurisdiction was valid based on one particular theory; could a future court
reconceptualize that decision as being justified by some other theory? 1 l 9 If so, it
could free itself from an otherwise binding decision regarding the theory the
precedent-setting court actually used.
Finally, there is the oft-invoked notion of "distinguishing" a case. It is routine
to debate whether earlier decisions can or cannot be distinguished. 120 But what
"7 Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm'n, 135 S. Ct. 2652, 2696
(2015) (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also Re, supra note 7, at 935 & n.73 (discussing this aspect
of Justice Scalia's opinion).
118 See, e.g., DuxBURY, supra note 44, at 107 (noting that judges might "formulate
completely fresh justifications" for earlier decision). But see Henry J. Friendly, In Praise of
Erie-and of the New Federal Common Law, 39 N.Y.U. L. REv. 383, 385-86 (1964) ("A
court's stated and, on its view, necessary basis for deciding does not become dictum because

a critic would have decided on another basis.").
"1 This latter example was the subject of an exchange between Justice Scalia and Justice
William Brennan in Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604, 612-13, 635-36 (1990). In
support of his conclusion that the Constitution permits personal jurisdiction based solely on
the defendant being served with process in the forum state, Justice Scalia cited a series of state
court decisions affirming that proposition. Id. at 612-13 (Scalia, J.). Justice Brennan countered
that "[m]any of the cases cited in Justice Scalia's opinion involve either announcement of the

rule in dictum or situations where factors other than in-state service supported the exercise of
jurisdiction." Id. at 636 n.10 (Brennan, J., concurring) (citation omitted). Justice Scalia
responded:
Justice Brennan's assertion that some of these cases involved dicta rather than holdings

is incorrect. In each case, personal service within the State was the exclusive basis for
the judgment that jurisdiction existed, and no other factor was relied upon. Nor is it
relevant for present purposes that these holdings might instead have been rested on other

available grounds.
Id. at 613 n.2 (Scalia, J.) (citation omitted).
120 See, e.g., Comptroller of the Treasury of Md. v. Wynne, 135 S. Ct. 1787, 1795 (2015)
("The principal dissent distinguishes these cases on the sole ground that they involved a tax
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exactly does it mean for a later case (Case Two) to distinguish an earlier case
(Case One), and how does that process relate to the various inquiries and issues
described above? It could mean some or all of the following:
* Because Case One and Case Two involve different "facts," the court
in Case Two may reach a different "outcome" than was reached in
Case One. 121

*
*

Aspects of the decision in Case One that otherwise might dictate the
same outcome in Case Two were "dicta."1 22
Aspects of Case One that otherwise might dictate the same outcome
in Case Two were not "necessary" parts of the decision in Case One
(perhaps because they extended beyond the precise facts of Case
One). 123

Differences between Case One and Case Two create an independent
basis for disregarding Case One, separate from and in addition to the
preceding theories.
Perhaps all of these are correct ways to conceptualize the process of
distinguishing cases under the conventional approach. Perhaps only some of
them are. But there does not seem to be a clear understanding about which lines
of argument perform which functions in this context.
*

As explained above, the conventional ways courts delineate the binding from
the non-binding aspects of judicial decisions have eluded coherent, predictable
application in practice. Perhaps, then, it is worth experimenting with a different
approach.

on gross receipts rather than net income. We see no reason why the distinction between gross
receipts and net income should matter. . . ."); Stanton v. Sims, 134 S. Ct. 3, 7 (2013) (noting
that Court's earlier decision could be "distinguished . .. as a case where the officers were not
in hot pursuit of the suspect, had not seen the suspect enter the neighbor's property, and had
no real reason to think the suspect was there," while here, "Stanton was in hot pursuit of
Patrick, he did see Patrick enter Sims' property, and he had every reason to believe that Patrick
was just beyond Sims' gate"); Genesis Healthcare Corp. v. Symczyk, 133 S. Ct. 1523, 1537
n.3 (2013) (Kagan, J., dissenting) (criticizing majority opinion for "painstakingly
distinguish[ing] [earlier] decisions on their individual facts" while "miss[ing] their common
take-away"); Am. Tradition P'ship v. Bullock, 132 S. Ct. 2490, 2491 (2012) ("Montana's
arguments in support of the judgment below either were already rejected in Citizens United,
or fail to meaningfully distinguish that case.").
121 See supra notes 114-17 and accompanying text (discussing the "facts-plus-outcome"

obligation).
122

See supra notes 86-88 and accompanying text (discussing distinction between binding

holding and nonbinding dicta).
123 See supra notes 89-91 and accompanying text (discussing obligation to follow parts of
opinion that were "necessary" to precedent-setting court's decision).
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CASE LAW AS EXPLICITLY STATED RULES

This Part develops an approach to stare decisis under which the lawmaking
content of a judicial decision would be limited to those decisional rules that the
court states explicitly in its opinion. Section A offers a new taxonomy for the

various parts of a judicial decision, focusing on the role that syllogisms play in
legal reasoning. Section B explains how an explicit-rules approach to stare
decisis resolves many of the conceptual and definitional problems identified
above. Section C clarifies how future courts might distinguish rules declared in
earlier decisions and adds a new component to the stare decisis framework: that
courts may be required to determine that one rule takes priority over another rule
in the event that they would dictate conflicting outcomes in a particular case.

Section D addresses the question of when the precedent-setting court's rule is
sufficiently related to the case to justify giving that rule stare decisis effect.
Section D also recognizes that stare decisis might apply not only to a court's
declaration of a particular rule, but also to a court's rejection of a particular rule.
A.

A New Taxonomy
The taxonomy proposed here distinguishes between syllogistic elements of a

judicial opinion and non-syllogistic elements. The first subsection explains the
role that syllogisms play in legal reasoning and identifies the components of
syllogistic arguments. The second subsection describes aspects of judicial
decisions that fall outside of syllogistic structure.
1.

Syllogistic Elements

In its most general form, a syllogism combines a major premise with a minor
premise to reach a conclusion. 124 The particular kind of syllogism that
characterizes legal reasoning is often called modus ponens.125 The court invokes

a rule that can be expressed in the form (If P, then Q}-what logicians call a
conditional statement. 126 Given that principle, the court makes an antecedent
finding (P), 127 which plugs into the beginning of the conditional statement to
generate the conclusion (Q). 128 Grounding this structure in more general terms,

124 See GARNER ET AL., supra note 8, at 23; James Hardisty, Reflections
on Stare Decisis,
55 IND. L.J. 41, 43 & n. 15 (1979) (describing "syllogistic form" of deductive legal reasoning

that has been noted by many authorities).
125 See IRVING M. COPI ET AL., INTRODUCTION TO LOGIC 318 (14th ed. 2011).
126 See id. at 300.
127 See id.
128 See id. at 318. Speaking somewhat more precisely, a logician would describe the rule

as: "For all cases, if P, then Q." The case-specific antecedent finding (that P is true in this
particular case) would be Pa, and the case-specific conclusion (Q is therefore true in this
particular case) would be Qa. See Steinman, supra note 13, at 1769 n.191.
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the rule (If P, then Q) is the major premise, the antecedent finding (P) is the
minor premise, and (Q) is the conclusion.1 29
For a very simple example of this general structure, consider Roper v.
Simmons,1 30 the Supreme Court decision holding that sentencing juveniles to
death is unconstitutional. 13 1 The basic syllogism could be understood as follows:
* If a defendant was under the age of eighteen when he committed a
crime, then it violates the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to
32
impose the death penalty for that crime (If P, then Q).1
* Christopher Simmons was under the age of eighteen when he
committed the crime at issue (P).1 33
* Therefore, it violated the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to
impose the death penalty for his crime (Q).
34
The Supreme Court's iconic decision in Miranda v. Arizona employs the
following syllogism:
* If an individual in custody is not "warned prior to any questioning
that he has the right to remain silent, that anything he says can be
used against him in a court of law, that he has the right to the presence
of an attorney, and that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be
appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so desires," then it
would violate the Fifth Amendment for evidence obtained as a result
35
of interrogation to be used against him (If P, then Q).1
* Ernesto Miranda was in custody and did not receive these warnings
(P).1

36

Therefore, it violated the Fifth Amendment to admit his confession
into evidence during his trial (Q).
As Mirandaillustrates, the if-then rule at the heart of a syllogism might itself
have multiple parts. (P) requires both that the individual was in custody and that
the individual did not receive the required warnings. To recognize that the
Miranda rule has two elements is simply to recognize that one must show two
things in order to establish (P).1 37
*

129 See, e.g., Hardisty, supra note 124, at 43

("[T]he formulation of law is the major

premise; the formulation of facts is the minor premise; and the result of the application of the
law to the facts is the conclusion."); see also GARNER ET AL., supra note 8, at 23.

130 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
131 Id. at 578.
132 Id. ("The Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments forbid imposition of the death penalty
on offenders who were under the age of 18 when their crimes were committed.").
113 Id. at 556.
134 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
'

Id. at 478-79.

136

Id. at 491-92.

137 That the required antecedent of a particular rule has multiple parts does not undermine
the fundamental if-then structure of the rule. See, e.g., GARNER ET AL., supra note 8, at 97

(describing the reasoning of a hypothetical case as appearing to be "if A, B, C, then X");

2017]

CASE LA W

1973

Finally, consider the Supreme Court's decision in Ashcroft v. Iqbal,138 a case
in which Javaid Iqbal sought monetary damages against Attorney General John
Ashcroft and FBI Director Robert Mueller based on his detention and treatment
by federal officials following the 9/11 attacks.139 One part of the opinion-where
the Court concluded that certain allegations in Javaid Iqbal's complaint could be
disregarded at the pleadings phase--employs the following syllogism:
* If an allegation is conclusory, then the court does not need to accept
it as true in deciding whether the complaint states a claim upon which
relief can be granted (If P, then Q).1 40
* The allegations in paragraphs ten, eleven, and ninety-six of Javaid
Iqbal's complaint are conclusory (P).141
* Therefore, the allegations in paragraphs ten, eleven, and ninety-six
do not need to be accepted as true (Q).
This Article uses the shorthand "rule" to refer to the if-then proposition at the
core of the court's syllogistic reasoning. As these examples demonstrate,
however, a court's if-then rule need not necessarily be a "rule" as that term is
used when contrasted with "standards." 1 42 According to that distinction, a "rule"
"binds a decisionmaker to respond in a determinate way to the presence of
delimited triggering facts," 143 whereas a "standard" is more open ended and
flexible (if not "frustratingly hazy and subjective").'" When the antecedent of
an if-then proposition can be assessed in a determinate, mechanical way (such
as whether the defendant was under eighteen when he committed an offense), 145
commentators would call it a rule. But when courts have more flexibility in
JOSEPH RAZ, THE AuTIHORrrY OF LAW 183 (1979) (describing hypothetical decision as being
"based on the rule that whenever A, B, C then X should be decided"); Alexander, supra note
7, at 19 (describing rules as having "a canonical formulation ... such as, 'Whenever facts A,
B, and C, and not fact D, decide for P"').
138

139

556 U.S. 662 (2009).
Id. at 668-69.

140 See id. at 678-79; Adam N. Steinman, The PleadingProblem, 62
STAN. L. REV. 1293,

1315-20 (2010).
141 See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 680-81.
142 See, e.g., Seana Valentine Shiffrin, Inducing Moral Deliberation: On the Occasional
Virtues of Fog, 123 HARv. L. REV. 1214, 1214-15 (2010); see generally, e.g., Kathleen M.
Sullivan, Foreword: The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 HARv. L. REV. 22 (1992)

(defining terms "rules" and "standards" and highlighting benefits and shortcomings of each
category).
143 Sullivan, supra note 142, at 58.
'" Shiffrin, supranote 142, at 1215 ("For some, its elusiveness represents a necessary cost

of its flexibility; for others, its resistance to algorithmic precisification provides sufficient
grounds to reject it as overly subjective." (footnote omitted)). On this spectrum, a speed limit

of "55 miles per hour" would be paradigmatically rule-like, while a prohibition against
"unreasonable speed" would be paradigmatically standard-like. See Steinman, supra note 13,

at 1777 (citing Frederick Schauer, Opinions as Rules, 62 U. CHI. L. REv. 1455, 1470 (1995)).
145 See supra note 132 and accompanying text.
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assessing whether the antecedent is true (such as whether a particular defendant
47
was "in custody"1 46 or whether an allegation in a complaint is "conclusory"),1
commentators would call it a standard. That distinction is not relevant, however,
for purposes of the taxonomy developed in this Article. The goal is simply to
identify the if-then proposition that the court used in its syllogistic reasoningregardless of how much flexibility future courts might have in deciding whether
148
the antecedent finding is satisfied in any given case.
2.

Non-Syllogistic Elements

Much of what appears in judicial opinions falls outside of the basic syllogistic
structure described above. A court will often provide supporting reasons for why
it has adopted a particular if-then principle to decide the case before it, or reasons
for why it is making a particular finding (the (P) that combines with the if-then
rule to generate the conclusion (Q)). I am less concerned with providing a precise
taxonomy of these non-syllogistic elements because, under the framework
developed here, everything outside of the syllogistic core does not create binding
obligations as a matter of stare decisis. There are fundamental differences,
however, between such supporting reasons and statements that are consciously
149
articulated as generalizable rules. Here are a few illustrations.
150
the Court's opinion striking down the
In Roper (diagrammed above),
juvenile death penalty observed that, at that time, thirty states prohibited the
juvenile death penalty.15 1 But the Court did not state a generalizable rule that if

146

See supra note 135 and accompanying text.
147 See supra note 140 and accompanying text.
148 Sometimes, the major premise in a syllogism might be stated not only as a conditional
but also as a biconditional-that is, a "statement[] that take[s] the form if-and-only-ifrather
than if-then." Steinman, supra note 13, at 1803. The stare decisis effect of biconditionals is
discussed infra notes 336-39 and accompanying text.
149 The Court highlights this distinction in United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 464
(2010), which considered the constitutionality of a statute criminalizing certain depictions of
animal cruelty. The government's defense of the statute relied on the position that "[w]hether
a given category of speech enjoys First Amendment protection depends upon a categorical
balancing of the value of the speech against its societal costs." Id. at 470 (quoting Brief for
United States at 8, United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460 (2010) (No. 08-769)). In rejecting
that principle, the majority opinion recognized that "this Court has often describedhistorically
unprotected categories of speech as being 'of such slight social value as a step to truth that
any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order
and morality."' Id. (quoting R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 383 (1992)). This kind
of reasoning in prior decisions was not binding, however, because "such descriptions are just
that-descriptive. They do not set forth a test that may be applied as a general matter to
permit the Government to imprison any speaker so long as his speech is deemed valueless or
unnecessary, or so long as an ad hoc calculus of costs and benefits tilts in a statute's favor."
Id. at 471 (emphasis added).
150 See supra notes 131-32 and accompanying text.
151 See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 564 (2005).
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thirty or more states prohibit a certain category of punishment, then the
punishment is unconstitutional. The Court also recognized that "juveniles are
more vulnerable or susceptible to negative influences and outside pressures,
including peer pressure,"1 52 but it did not declare a generalizable rule that some
particular threshold of susceptibility to peer pressure would compel a certain
conclusion about the constitutionality of a particular punishment. And the Court
cited several international agreements prohibiting capital punishment for
juvenile offenders.1 53 It did not, however, state a generalizable rule that U.S.
courts were bound to apply such treaties when interpreting the U.S.
Constitution. 154
In Miranda, the Court recounted various historical events relating to the
privilege against self-incrimination-from the British Star Chamber trials' 5 to
twentieth-century police interrogation practices.1 56 It cited studies on the
psychological effects of custodial interrogation 5 7 and observed that "the very
fact of custodial interrogation exacts a heavy toll on individual liberty and trades
on the weakness of individuals."15 8 But the Court did not articulate any
generalizable rule that would compel a particular judicial disposition based on
the presence of such historical events or psychological insights. All of these
reasons supported Miranda's ultimate rule, but they were not themselves
components of the Court's syllogistic reasoning.
In other instances, however, it is harder to determine what purpose a court's
non-syllogistic reasons serve. Are they meant to support the if-then rule the court
uses in its decisional syllogism? Or are they meant to support the particular
antecedent finding that combines with the rule to produce the ultimate
conclusion? In Iqbal, for example, the court expressed concern about the
burdens that the discovery process might impose on defendants if a case survives
a motion to dismiss.1 59 The Court rejected the notion that such burdens might be
lessened through a "careful-case-management approach," 60 and it stated that the
costs on governmental defendants like Ashcroft and Mueller are "only magnified
when Government officials are charged with responding to. . . a 'national and
international security emergency unprecedented in the history of the American

Id. at 569.
' See id. at 576.
114 See id. at 622-23 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting that United States either had not ratified
or had made reservations to these treaties).
.. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 458-59 (1966).
156 See id. at 445-46 (illustrating the "incommunicado" and at times violent nature of incustody interrogations from the 1930s until the time of the opinion).
152

'

See id. at 447-48.

15 Id. at 455.
See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 685-86 (2008).
Io Id. at 685; see also id. at 686 ("We decline respondent's invitation to relax the pleading
requirements on the ground that the Court of Appeals promises petitioners minimally intrusive
discovery.").
159
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Republic."' 16 1 It was unclear, however, whether these observations supported
(1) the Court's embrace of its rule that conclusory allegations need not be
accepted as true at the pleading phase; (2) the Court's conclusion that the
particular paragraphs in the complaint were, in fact, conclusory; or (3) some
162
other aspect of the Court's decision.

Rules, Syllogistic Reasoning, and Stare Decisis

B.

The syllogistic structure described in the previous Section may seem
somewhat rudimentary. But it provides a starting point for a workable approach

to identifying the law that any given case generates. The core of this approach is
that stare decisis would require future courts to follow only the if-then rule

around which the precedent-setting court based its decision. This Section will
highlight some of the advantages of an explicit-rules approach on the way
toward clarifying, in Sections C and D, some additional aspects of this. Article's
proposal. Part IV will respond more directly to possible critiques of an explicitrules approach.

One advantage of emphasizing syllogistic rules is that any rule that takes the
form (If P, then Q) is one that is consciously stated in prospectively
generalizable terms: in all cases where (P) is true, the conclusion (Q) follows.
Thus, this taxonomy for judicial decisions concretely reveals the "governing
rules of law"1 63 that courts recognize should have stare decisis effect. As Justice
Brandeis memorably wrote: "[I]n most matters it is more important that the

1
applicable rule of law be settled than that it be settled right." 6 The taxonomy
proposed here identifies which "rule of law" the particular precedent-setting
decision has "settled."l 65 This approach would employ what is essentially a clear

statement rule. If the precedent-setting court wishes to constrain future courts
66
via stare decisis, then it must state the content of that constraint explicitly.1

Id. at 685 (quoting Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143, 147-48 (2d Cir. 2007)).
A final non-syllogistic element of a judicial decision might be the background facts of
case. Insofar as stare decisis imposes a "facts-plus-outcome" obligation, such
given
any
background facts would be important, regardless of whether they are explicitly used in the
court's syllogistic reasoning or are explicitly invoked as supporting reasons for a particular
finding or a particular rule. See supra notes 115-16 and accompanying text. Under this
Article's proposal, however, background facts do not figure into what binding law a case
161

162

creates as a matter of stare decisis.
163 Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44,67 (1996) (quoting Allegheny v. ACLU,
492 U.S. 573, 668 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in

part)).
'"

Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393,406 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).

165 Id.
1

Such clear statement rules are not unusual. See, e.g., Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032,

1041 (1983) ("If a state court chooses merely to rely on federal precedents as it would on the
precedents of all other jurisdictions, then it need only make clear by a plain statement in its
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To be clear, this Article's approach would not require that the precedentsetting court explicitly use the (If P, then Q) formulation. In Roper, for example,
the actual quote from the Court was: "The Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments
forbid imposition of the death penalty on offenders who were under the age of
18 when their crimes were committed." 67 This would qualify as a binding rule,
however, because it can be articulated in the form (If P, then Q) and it was the
major premise in the syllogistic reasoning leading to the conclusion that it was
unconstitutional to impose the death penalty on Christopher Simmons. 168 The
language of this sort of rule, therefore, is fundamentally different from other
statements like "juveniles are susceptible to peer pressure," 69 or "custodial
interrogation is psychologically stressful,"1 70 or "courts are bad at managing
discovery" 17 1-- even though such statements might be characterized as
supporting the court's decision in a general sense.1 72
The role that if-then rules play in syllogistic reasoning draws out more sharply
the distinction between "doctrinal propositions" and "social propositions."1 73 As
Professor Frederick Schauer explained (describing the work of Professor Melvin
Eisenberg):
Doctrinal propositions include all those "propositions that purport to state
legal rules and are found in or easily derived from textual sources that are
generally taken to express legal doctrine." Social propositions encompass
essentially everything else, including moral propositions like "it is wrong
to abandon one's ill parents," policy propositions like "hindering the
progress of the automobile industry will decrease the gross national product
of the United States," and experiential propositions such as "Williamsburg
is prettier than Newark."1 74
It is precisely the fact that a proposition can be stated in if-then form that makes
it a doctrinal proposition that "express[es] legal doctrine."175
The taxonomy described in Section A also provides a framework for
determining that a particular rule is-in the commonly used parlance-

judgment or opinion that the federal cases are being used only for the purpose of guidance,
and do not themselves compel the result that the court has reached.").
167 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005).
168 See supra notes 131-33 and accompanying text.
169 See supra note 152 and accompanying text (citing Roper,
543 U.S. at 569).
17o See supra notes 157-58 and accompanying text (citing Miranda v. Arizona,
384 U.S.
436, 447-48, 455 (1966)).
171 See supranote 160 and accompanying text (citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
685-

86 (2008)).
172

See Steinman, supra note 13, at 1800 n.350.

173 MELVIN A. EISENBERG, THE NATURE OF THE COMMON LAW 1, 14 (1988).
174 Frederick Schauer, Is the Common Law Law?, 77 CALIF. L. REV. 455, 460 (1989)
(citations omitted) (quoting EISENBERG, supra note 173, at 1).

175 EISENBERG, supra note 173, at 1.
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"necessary to" the court's decision. 176 A rule is necessary when the court uses
that rule to connect a particular finding to a particular conclusion. There is no
need to inquire whether a rule is hypothetically "necessary" in the sense that the
177
court might conceivably have decided the case without using that rule. We
need only see that this is, in fact, the rule that the court used in laying out its
syllogistic reasoning.
Although the syllogistic structure is important for identifying the decisional
rule the court used, the other syllogistic elements-the (P) and (Q) that form the
input and output of the rule-would not create any binding stare decisis
obligations under this Article's framework. That is, courts would not be required
to infer stare decisis obligations from the mere fact that the court made a
particular finding (P) or a particular conclusion (Q), as they might be required
to do under a "facts-plus-outcome" approach. 178 Under this Article's framework,
therefore, a court's opportunity to enhance clarity and predictability through
hierarchical stare decisis lies in its ability to articulate decisional rules.
Naturally, the impact of a syllogistic rule going forward will depend on whether
(P) is satisfied in future cases. If more guidance on that question is justified and
desirable, a court could formulate a rule in the form (If 0, then P), or perhaps (If
0, then Not-P).
This approach to stare decisis would not require that courts formulate such
rules when deciding cases. Scholars have long debated, for example, the relative
179
On
merits of "minimalism" and "maximalism" in judicial decision-making.
a
contemplating
court
a
that
observed
has
Sunstein
Cass
this point, Professor
should
court
the
First,
costs.
of
kinds
two
consider
generalizable rule should
consider "decision costs," which include "the costs of reaching judgments"
regarding a particular rule.180 Second, the court should consider "error costs,"
181
This Article's
which include the costs of mistakenly declaring a bad rule.
about how
decisions
conscious
to
make
ability
the
courts
approach would give
then
desirable,
and
is
justified
rule
a
generalizable
If
costs.
best to balance these
But
effect.
decisis
stare
to
have
rule
that
and
expect
rule
that
a court may declare
of
light
in
is
justified
rule
generalizable
such
no
that
a court may also conclude
give
would
here
developed
framework
The
costs.
error
and
costs
the decision
effect to that determination as well, because stare decisis would not force future
courts to infer binding obligations from other aspects of the court's decision.

176
1n

See supra notes 89-91 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 92-97 and accompanying text.

171 See supra notes 114-15 and accompanying text. An approach that eliminates the

obligation to reconcile the facts-plus-outcome data points of prior decisions avoids the
conceptual problems inherent in such an approach. See supra notes 115-19 and accompanying
text.
179 See generally CASS R. SUNsTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE

SUPREME COURT (1999); Grove, supra note 18; Sunstein, supra note 18.
s Sunstein, supra note 18, at 16-18.
181 Id. at 18-19.
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This approach would admittedly leave many aspects of a judicial opinion on
the nonbinding side of the ledger. But to say that a court's case-specific findings
and conclusions, along with other non-syllogistic reasons the court provides, do
not create binding obligations as a matter of stare decisis is not to say that they
are entirely insignificant. These other aspects of a judicial opinion may inform
the sort of traditional common law reasoning that could remain influential and
informative even in a world where binding stare decisis is limited to explicitly
stated rules.' 82 However, given some of the conceptual problems identified
earlier (and for additional reasons discussed in Part IV), these other aspects of
precedent-setting decisions should not create binding case law as a matter of
hierarchical stare decisis.
C.

DistinguishingRules

What would it mean to "distinguish" a prior case under an explicit-rules
approach to stare decisis? As proposed here, such distinctions would still be
possible. This Section begins by describing how courts distinguish principles
declared in Acts of Congress, even when such statutes are superior to judicially
made law in the lawmaking hierarchy. This Section then explains how the
process of distinguishing prior case law (even from superior courts) may be
understood in a similar fashion.
1.

How Courts "Distinguish" Statutes

To conceptualize how case distinctions would work under an explicit-rules
approach to stare decisis, consider what courts have done with federal statutes.
One example is equitable tolling of a statute of limitations.183 A statute of
limitations may command: "If six years has elapsed from the time of the
plaintiff's injury, then the claim is time-barred." 84 (IfP, then Q.) But ajudicially
created equitable tolling principle provides: "If the plaintiff has been pursuing
his rights diligently and some extraordinary circumstance prevented him from
filing within the limitations period, then the claim is not time-barred."185 (IfX,
then Not-Q.)
In cases covered by equitable tolling, these two rules are in conflict. (P) is
true, because the action was filed more than six years after the injury. And (X)
182 See supra note 78 and accompanying text (discussing persuasive value of nonbinding
law). These other aspects of judicial opinions may also be relevant to certain attitudes about
the best way to decide cases. See supra notes 25-28 and accompanying text.
183 See Steinman, supra note 13, at 1770.
184

See, e.g., 41 U.S.C. § 7103(a)(4)(A) (2012) (imposing six-year statute of limitations for

presenting claims under Contract Disputes Act of 1978), described in Menominee Indian

Tribe of Wis. v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 750, 753-54 (2016).
185 See, e.g., Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 649 (2010) ("We have previously made
clear that a 'petitioner' is 'entitled to equitable tolling' only if he shows '(1) that he has been
pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way'
and prevented timely filing." (quoting Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005))).
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is true, because the requirements for equitable tolling are met. Accordingly, the
first rule commands the conclusion (Q), while the second rule commands the
conclusion (Not-Q). This conflict is resolved in favor of equitable tolling (NotQ), even though it comes from an inferior legal source-a nonconstitutional
judicially created rule rather than a binding statute enacted by Congress.
186
Some defenses to criminal liability are also instructive. A federal criminal
statute may provide: "If a defendant has received a firearm while under
187
(If P, then Q.) But the
indictment for a felony, then she is guilty of a crime."
federal court may recognize an uncodified duress defense, which could provide:
"If a defendant engaged in criminal conduct under threat of imminent death or
bodily injury, then she is not guilty of a crime."188 (If X, then Not-Q.)
Of course, there may be strong disagreement over whether such
189
distinguishing principles are appropriate in any given situation. But it cannot
be said that the development of such distinguishing rules categorically subverts
the lawmaking hierarchy. These examples confirm that distinguishing rules are
possible even in situations where they create a logical conflict with an earlier
rule, and even where a superior lawmaking institution declares that earlier rule.
2.

Distinguishing Case Law

Under the stare decisis framework developed here, one can understand the
notion of distinguishing prior judicial decisions in the same way. The binding,
law-generating content of any given case would be solely the if-then rule (or
rules) at the core of the court's syllogistic reasoning. But even if the precedent-

18'

See Baude & Sachs, supra note 40, at 1105 (discussing "traditional defenses such as

duress, necessity, or self-defense" that "are routinely applied by federal courts"); Caleb
Nelson, State and FederalModels of the Interaction Between Statutes and Unwritten Law, 80
U. Cm. L. REV. 657, 752-56 (2013) (discussing various uncodified defenses to federal
criminal liability).
187

See 18 U.S.C. § 922(n) (2012) ("It shall be unlawful for any person who is under

indictment for a crime . . to . .. receive any firearm or ammunition. . . ."), discussed in
Dixon v. United States, 548 U.S. 1, 3 (2006).
1" See, e.g., United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 410-11 (1980); see also Dixon, 548
U.S. at 13-14 (recognizing duress defense "[e]ven though the Safe Streets Act does not
mention the defense of duress"). Abstention doctrines provide another example. See
Steinman, supra note 13, at 1769 ("Abstention doctrines confirm that even when courts are
bound by a statute, they may develop what one might call distinguishing principlesprinciples that, as a logical matter, trump the ostensibly binding statutory principle.").
1" Compare, e.g., McQuiggin v. Perkins, 133 S. Ct. 1924, 1928, 1931 (2013) (recognizing
"equitable exception" to one-year statute of limitations for federal habeas petitions in cases
where there is strong evidence of actual innocence), with id. at 1937 (Scalia, J., dissenting)
("What is the source of the Court's power to fashion what it concedes is an 'exception' to this
clear statutory command?").
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setting decision establishes the rule (If P, then Q), the later court may declare a
distinguishing rule (If X, then Not-Q).1 90
For example, consider the relationship between the Supreme Court's Miranda
decision and its decision five years later in Harris v. New York,191 which dealt
with the use of a defendant's statements for purposes of impeachment. 192 As
discussed earlier, Miranda's reasoning established the following rule:
* If an individual in custody is not given the required warnings prior to
questioning, then it would violate the Fifth Amendment for evidence
obtained as a result of interrogation to be used against him (If P, then
193
Q).
Under an explicit-rules framework, this rule is binding on future courts. In
Harris, however, the Court developed a distinguishing rule:
* If evidence obtained in violation of the Miranda rule is used for
impeachment purposes, then its use does not violate the defendant's
Fifth Amendment rights (If X, then Not-Q). 194
Reasonable minds might differ regarding whether this distinguishing rule was
justified or desirable. 195 But such distinguishing rules are not fundamentally
contrary to the idea of binding rules. As discussed above, courts also employ
distinguishing rules in the face of binding statutes. This understanding provides
a precise definition of what it means to distinguish a case. It is to articulate a
second rule-one that logically compels the opposite conclusion of the first
rule-that incorporates an element that had not been included in the first rule. 196

11 When inferior lawmakers develop distinguishing rules-as would occur if a lower court
distinguishes a Supreme Court decision-the superior lawmaker retains the ability to correct
distinguishing principles that are improper, since the higher court will be able to review that
lower court decision on appeal. See Steinman, supra note 13, at 1773-74 ("If the higher court
meant for its broad rule to apply without the distinguishing exception, it can reverse the lower
court.").
19 401 U.S. 222 (1971).
192 See id. at 226 (holding that defendant's statements, inadmissible under Miranda
rule,
were appropriately used for impeachment purposes).
193 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436,
478-79 (1966).
194 Harris,401 U.S. at 222-26. For a discussion of the relationship between Miranda
and
Harris, see Re, supra note 7, at 933-34.
19 See, e.g., Alan M. Dershowitz & John Hart Ely, Harris v. New York: Some Anxious
Observations on the Candor andLogic of the EmergingNixon Majority, 80 YALE L.J. 1198,
1199 (1971) (arguing that Harris was wrongly decided).
196 See Steinman, supra note 13, at 1773-74. For an additional illustration of how judicially
declared rules might be distinguished in this way, see id. at 1804-06 (discussing relationship
between Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), and Planned Parenthood of Southeastern
Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992)). Recent work by Professors Will Baude and
Steve Sachs emphasizes the notion of "defeasible rules"-that is, "prima facie rules that are
subject to defeat in particular cases-and often leaving unspecified exactly which cases those
are." Baude & Sachs, supra note 40, at 1101, 1107 (citing, e.g., Carlos Ivin Chesfievar et al.,
Logical Models of Argument, 32 ACM COMPUTING SURVEYs 337, 338 (2000); Neil
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This insight regarding distinguishing cases adds one more component to this
Article's stare decisis framework. The binding content of case law can also
include a court's determination that one rule takes priority over another rule
when those rules would dictate conflicting outcomes. The process of
distinguishing cases is one example. The court articulating the distinguishing
rule is by necessity concluding that the new rule takes priority over the initial
19
rule that is being distinguished (as in the Miranda-Harrisexample). 7 But
198
priority rules might be called upon in other contexts as well.
The RequiredNexus Between the "Case" and the "Law"
Although there are benefits to allowing courts to declare generalizable rules
that are binding on future courts via stare decisis, courts do not have freestanding
legislative authority. It has long been recognized that for a court to make "case
law," some connection must exist between the "case" being decided and the
"law" being generated. This has often been cast in terms of whether a particular
199
As explained
part of an opinion was "necessary" to the court's decision.
this point.200
operationalizing
of
way
a
problematic
is
term
earlier, however, that
Under the approach outlined in this Article, the requisite nexus would be
defined as a function of how the precedent-setting court employs the if-then
decisional rule in deciding the precedent-setting case. This Section will also
introduce the possibility that a court may not only make a binding declaration of
"what the law is";20 1 it may also make a binding declaration of what the law is
not.

D.

1.

Declaring What the Law Is

One situation where the required nexus would exist is where the court uses an
if-then rule as part of its syllogistic reasoning, as in the examples above. Roper,
for example, used the rule forbidding the death penalty for crimes committed as
202
a juvenile to vacate Christopher Simmons's sentence. Miranda used the rule

Law and Logic, in INFORMATICS AND THE FOUNDATIONS OF
99, 103 (Zenon Bankowski et al. eds., 1995)). This Article's approach to
distinguishing explicitly stated rules recognizes that rules stated by prior courts are indeed
"defeasible," but the distinguishing court must state its own rule that specifies the category of
cases (those where (X) is true), see supra notes 185, 188, 190, 194 and accompanying text,
where that initial rule is "subject to defeat."
1" See supra notes 191-94 and accompanying text.

MacCormick, Defeasibility in
LEGAL REASONING

198 See infra Section V.A (discussing the possibility that a court would have to prioritize
between two rules that were independently declared in prior cases and would dictate

conflicting conclusions in the now pending case).
199 See supra notes 89-91 and accompanying text.

See supra notes 92-113 and accompanying text.
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) (emphasis added) ("It is
emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.").
2"
201

202 See supra notes 131-33 and accompanying text.
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regarding the warnings that must be given before a custodial interrogation to
conclude that Ernesto Miranda's Fifth Amendment rights had been violated.203
And Iqbal used the rule regarding conclusory allegations to decide that certain
allegations could be disregarded in deciding whether Javaid Iqbal's complaint
survived a motion to dismiss. 204
Given the nature of appellate review, however, the court declaring an if-then
rule may not always apply the rule. The Supreme Court, for example, might state
a decisional principle (If P, then Q), but then remand to the lower courts to
decide whether (P) is true-and hence whether the conclusion (Q) should
follow. To use a simple example, consider the Supreme Court's decision in
Hollandv. Florida,205 which addressed whether a habeas petitioner could invoke
equitable tolling of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act's oneyear limitations period. 206 The lower court had refused to allow equitable tolling,
but the Supreme Court reversed and remanded. 207 In doing so, it declared that
the lower court should apply the following rule: If the plaintiff has been pursuing
his rights diligently and some extraordinary circumstance prevented him from
filing within the limitations period, then the claim is not time-barred. 208
In this context, stare decisis should make binding any if-then decisional rule
that is the basis for the appellate court's remedy. Where, as in a case like
Holland, a court remands the case for lower courts to apply the if-then rule, that
rule bears a sufficient nexus to the appellate court's decision to justify giving the
rule stare decisis effect. 209
Finally, as mentioned earlier, another component of binding case law can be
a court's determination that one rule takes priority over another rule. This could
occur, for example, when a court develops a distinguishing rule. 210 Here, too,
the decision to prioritize one rule over another must have the requisite nexus to
the case the court is deciding. That nexus should exist, and the prioritization
decision should be binding, when the rules being prioritized would generate
conflicting conclusions in the case before the court. 211

203

See supra notes 134-36 and accompanying text.

204 See supra notes 139-41 and accompanying text.
205
206

560 U.S. 631 (2010).
Id. at 634-35.

207

Id.

208

See id. at 649, 653-54.

209 See Steinman, supra note 13, at 1801 (observing that a court could affirmatively
endorse an if-then principle, and then remand to the lower courts to apply that principle).
210 See supra Section III.C.2.
211 This Article's framework does not propose a solution to three other problems relating

to the required nexus between a "case" and its "law": (1) biconditional statements, (2)
decisions where the court addresses multiple issues, and (3) interpretive methodology. Those
problems are described in more detail infra Section V.E.
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Declaring What the Law Is Not

The clarifying benefits of stare decisis can also be served by allowing courts
to reject a particular if-then decisional rule, and thereby to require future courts
not to employ that rule to decide future cases. Such a rejection would have a
sufficient nexus to the case before the court in a number of situations. A litigant
might present a particular rule to support her litigation position. If a court decides
against the litigant's position because that rule is not legally correct, then the
court's rejection should have stare decisis effect. That is, future courts would
violate binding law if they were to invoke that rule going forward. Similarly, a
higher court might grant an appellate remedy on the basis that a rule the lower
court used is not legally correct. If so, the rejection of the lower court's rule
should have stare decisis effect.
For a more concrete example, consider the Supreme Court's decision in
UnitedStates v. Alvarez, 2 12 in which the defendant had been convicted under the
Stolen Valor Act for falsely claiming to have been awarded the Congressional
Medal of Honor. 213 In seeking to uphold the conviction before the Supreme
Court, the government argued for the following categorical rule: If a statute
criminalizes false statements, then a conviction under the statute does not violate
the First Amendment because false statements are beyond constitutional
protection. 214 If accepted, that principle would have confirmed the government's
litigation position (that the defendant's conviction was constitutional). But the
Court rejected that principle and found that the defendant's conviction violated
the First Amendment. 215 Under this framework, the rejection of that rule would
be binding as a matter of stare decisis, meaning that it would be legally incorrect
for future courts to use that rule as a basis for future decisions.
IV.

POTENTIAL CRITICISMS OF RULE-CENTERED STARE DECISIS

This Part addresses several possible critiques of the approach to stare decisis
described in Part III. Section A addresses criticisms that this Article's proposal
would give decisions too much stare decisis effect by making explicitly stated
generalizable rules binding on future courts. Section B addresses criticisms that
this proposal gives decisions too little stare decisis effect, both by denying stare
decisis effect to aspects of a judicial decision other than those explicitly declared
rules and by allowing future courts too much leeway in distinguishing earlier
case law.

132 S. Ct. 2537 (2012).
Id. at 2542.
214 See id. at 2545.
215 See id. ("The Court has never endorsed the categorical rule the Government advances:
that false statements receive no First Amendment protection. Our prior decisions have not
confronted a measure, like the Stolen Valor Act, that targets falsity and nothing more.").
212

213
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Too Much Stare Decisis?

A.

To some, an approach that allows a judicial decision to declare binding,
generalizable rules would define the scope of stare decisis too broadly. 2 16 This
critique posits that when courts "write in quasistatutory language," they "are no
longer behaving like courts"; they are "usurping the power of a majoritarian
body." 2 17 One commentator observed: "It does not fit our picture of how a court
should behave to have it issuing either canonical statements or policy
programmes like a little legislature." 218 Rather, courts should "decide disputes,
not issue edicts." 219
These perspectives merit consideration. But to adopt an approach to stare
decisis that denies courts the ability to declare prospectively binding rules would
come at the expense of another goal of stare decisis: to provide greater clarity
and predictability in future cases. Stare decisis's underlying premise that "it is
important that the applicable rule of law be settled" is directly opposed to the
view that courts may never declare what the "applicable rule of law" is in a
binding way. 220
On this point, the Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized that its main
purpose is not simply to decide disputes; rather, "certiorari jurisdiction exists to
clarify the law." 221 As Justice Scalia put it, "we are not, and for well over a
century have not been, a court of error correction." 222 Although the Court
performs this law-clarification function in the context of particular cases
presenting particular claims of error by the courts below, our system looks to the
Court to "settle[]" the "applicable rule of law." 2 23 The stare decisis effect of a
Supreme Court decision is what makes the rule "settled." Indeed, it is common
to criticize judicial decisions when they fail to articulate more generalizable
224
standards that will guide courts going forward.
A related critique of allowing courts to declare binding generalizable rules is
that judges may not be institutionally equipped to gather the information needed

216 See supra notes 19-20 and accompanying text (discussing the "legislating from the
bench" critique).
217 Schauer, supra note 144, at 1457-58 (recognizing but not endorsing this critique).

218 Michael S. Moore, Precedent, Induction, andEthical Generalization, in PRECEDENT IN

LAW 183, 187 (Laurence Goldstein ed., 1987); see also Kozel, supra note 7, at 219 ("By
speaking in terms of a 'judicial power' that extends to 'Cases' and 'Controversies,' Article III

arguably suggests that deference should be withheld from judicial hypothesizing and perhaps
even rulemaking." (footnotes omitted)).
219 Moore, supra note 218, at 187.

Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
City & Cty. of S.F. v. Sheehan, 135 S. Ct. 1765, 1774 (2015).
222 Id. at 1780 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
223 Burnet, 285 U.S. at 406 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
224 See supranote 21 and accompanying text (citing sources that criticize judicial decisions
that fail to articulate generalizable standards).
220
221
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to make such rules. 22 5 Although this is a legitimate point, it is one that judges
should take into account in deciding (1) whether to declare a generalizable rule
in the course of resolving a particular case, and (2) if so, precisely what that rule
should be. This was a key insight of Professor Sunstein's work on judicial
minimalism-to identify the considerations that should inform whether and to
what extent a more minimalist or more maximalist ruling is justified. 226
Of course, we should be wary of how accurately a precedent-setting court will
balance these considerations in deciding whether to declare a generalizable rule
in any given case. That is why it is important to have a clear understanding of
how future courts can distinguish prior case law. This Article's approach to
distinguishing cases mitigates the valid institutional critiques that one might
lodge against judicially declared rules. Rules that are overbroad, reaching
situations that the precedent-setting court might not have contemplated, can be
distinguished-even when the initial rule the precedent-setting court declared
would, as a logical matter, compel a contrary result. 22 7 This framework gives
courts the power to clarify open questions without denying future courts the
flexibility to develop distinguishing principles to address unaccounted-for
situations.
B.

Not Enough Stare Decisis?

This Section responds to possible criticisms that this Article's proposal would
give decisions too little stare decisis effect. It first considers the critique that this
approach would give future courts too much freedom to distinguish earlier cases.
It then considers the argument that stare decisis should extend beyond explicitly
stated rules-to case-specific findings and conclusions and other non-syllogistic
reasons.

See, e.g., RAZ, supra note 137, at 188 (noting that judges "do not enjoy the research
and drafting facilities generally available to legislators"); Brianne J. Gorod, The Adversarial
225

Myth: Appellate Court Extra-Record Factfinding, 61 DUKE L.J. 1, 4 (2011) (noting that

"appellate courts often look outside the record the parties develop before the trial court,
turning instead to their own independent research and to amicus briefs, even though the

resulting factual findings will not have been thoroughly tested by the adversarial process");
Allison Orr Larsen, Confronting Supreme Court Fact Finding, 98 VA. L. REV. 1255, 1263

(2012) (criticizing "the prevalence of in-house fact gathering at the U.S. Supreme Court");
Moore, supra note 218, at 187 (arguing against certain approaches to stare decisis based on
the "ideal ... of institutional appropriateness" and the fact that "[c]ourts deciding individual
cases do not have the information before them (nor the means to get it)" to generate

prospectively binding obligations that would affect future courts in future cases); Elizabeth
G. Thornburg, The Curious Appellate Judge: Ethical Limits on Independent Research, 28

REV. LITIG. 131, 143-44 (2008) (noting the challenge of developing "a clear and workable
framework for regulating judicial research that both allows judges access to necessary
information and comports with the fundamental requirements of due process").
226 See Sunstein, supra note 18, at 16-19.
227

See supra Section III.C.2.
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Too Much Freedom to Distinguish

As explained in the preceding Section, the ability to distinguish precedential
rules is an important safety valve given the legitimate concerns about what is,
for all intents and purposes, legislating by the judiciary. Yet one might take the
opposite position: to recognize the ability of future courts to craft distinguishing
rules makes it too easy for them to undermine binding case law. This argument
parallels critiques of judicially created exceptions to statutory rules, which,
absent constitutional concerns, are ostensibly superior in the lawmaking
hierarchy to judge-made law.228
Whether it is optimal to permit such distinguishing rules (in either context)
ultimately depends on how much faith one has in the foresight and capacity of
the "superior" lawmaker. Should we assume that the legislature or the precedentsetting court-in declaring the rule (If P, then Q)-adequately accounted for the
full universe of situations where (P) is true, and thus meant the rule to apply
without exceptions? Or should we treat such a rule as "defeasible," 229 and
thereby empower future courts-in cases litigated by future litigants-to
consider whether particular circumstances might justify a distinguishing rule?
This Article's approach rejects the view that future courts must apply
judicially declared rules without any mechanism for developing exceptions.
Institutional concerns about the judiciary's lawmaking capacity undermine the
view that rules stated in a judicial opinion should be categorically viewed as the
final and complete word regarding every case where (P) is true. Yet this Article's
approach would also clarify the precise means by which a judicially declared
rule may be distinguished-only by explicitly declaring a distinguishing rule. 2 3 0
On balance, this is an improvement over the current system, which lacks a clear
articulation of what it means to "distinguish" prior case law, 231 and which has at
times recognized that courts have considerable leeway to distinguish binding
precedents even on unprincipled grounds. 232 Of course, it would leave space for
differing views on precisely when such distinguishing rules are appropriateeither in particular cases or as a more general matter. As with other issues, then,
this Article's approach provides a framework for identifying the law-generating
content of a given case and the permissible moves courts might make within that
law, without prejudging ongoing debates over the "best" way to decide future
cases in light of prior judicial decisions. 233

228 See supra Section III.C. 1.
229 See supra note 196.
230 See supra Section IlI.C.2.
231 See supra Section I.B.
232 See supra note 117 and accompanying text (discussing the view that courts may avoid

an earlier decision by pointing to factual differences that are "accurate-in-fact" but
"inconsequential-in-principle").
233 See supra notes 26-28 and accompanying text.
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Too Much Freedom to Ignore Facts, Outcomes, and Other Reasons

This Article's approach might also be criticized for allowing courts to
disregard aspects of precedent-setting decisions other than explicitly declared
rules. It could be argued that future courts should be required to reconcile their
decisions with the facts-plus-outcome data point established in the precedentsetting decision. It could also be argued that future courts must decide cases
consistently with reasons offered by the precedent-setting court even when those
reasons do not take the form of explicitly stated, generalizable rules.
One rationale for expanding the elements of judicial decisions that create
binding obligations is consistency--or phrased slightly differently, equality. The
notion that "[1]ike cases should be treated alike"-which dates back at least as
far as Aristotle 234-iS often invoked as a conceptual driver for stare decisis.235
One could argue that requiring consistency not only with the precedent-setting
court's explicitly stated, generalizable rules but also with its other findings,
conclusions, or non-syllogistic reasons would maximize the extent to which
"like cases" would be "treated alike." 23 6 To evaluate this argument, one must
assess not only the value of equality and consistency in and of itself, but also the
extent to which consistency for consistency's sake might undermine other
values.
Scholars have recognized that an equality rationale alone may be insufficient
to achieve truly just outcomes. 237 Rather, justice requires just principles that
determine (1) who are "like" enough to be "treated alike," and (2) what that just
treatment is. 238 When the precedent-setting court explicitly articulates these

234

John

E. Coons, Consistency, 75 CALIF. L. REv. 59, 59 & n.1 (1987) (citing ARISTOTLE,

ETHICANICOMACHEAV.3. 1131a-1131b (W. Ross trans., 1925)).
235 See, e.g., GREENAWALT, supra note 38, at 184 (noting that one basis "for a doctrine of
precedent ... is that people should be treated equally and, thus, those in comparable positions
should receive the same treatment, even if an initial decision about treatment was somewhat

misguided"); Coons, supra note 234, at 98-99 ("When we treat like cases alike, we do so not
because some arbitrary definition of a rule gives us no choice ... but, quite independently,
because we think it is the right thing to do.").
236 See Coons, supra note 234, at 59.
237 See, e.g., Kent Greenawalt, How Empty Is the Idea ofEquality?, 83 COLuM. L. REV.

1167, 1169 (1983) ("[I]n the absence of substantive criteria indicating which people are equal
for particular purposes and what constitutes equal treatment, the formal principle of equality
provides no guidance for how people should be treated."); Christopher J. Peters, Foolish
Consistency: On Equality, Integrity, andJustice in Stare Decisis, 105 YALE L.J. 2031, 2038

(1996) (arguing that "deontological theories of adjudicative consistency are wrong"); Peter
Westen, The Empty Idea of Equality, 95 HARV. L. REv. 537, 547-48 (1982) (arguing that

equality is "a simple tautology").
238 See Westen, supra note 237, at 547 (arguing that equality is "entirely '[clircular"'

because it ultimately means only that "people who by a rule should be treated alike should by
the rule be treated alike" (alteration in original) (quoting Don Locke, The Trivializabilityof

Universalizability, 77 PHIL. REv. 25, 25 (1968))); id. at 551 ("To say that a rule should be
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principles, this Article's proposal would give those principles stare decisis
effect. To extend stare decisis beyond those explicitly stated, generalizable rules,
however, is to impose obligations with regard to matters for which the court was
unable to articulate such a principle. And without such a principle, equality
might simply mean that parties are equally subjected to injustice. As Professor
Larry Alexander argued: "[I]f most members of a particular group of people
have been subjected to grossly unjust treatment-say, slavery or genocideseeing that the rest of the members are subjected to the same treatment is no less
239
wrong despite its furtherance of 'equality."'
Furthermore, there is a fundamental tension between, on the one hand,
fostering equality and consistency between past and future litigants and, on the
other hand, protecting the participatory interests of those future litigants. 240 In
the context of preclusion law, the Supreme Court has expressed concern that too
broad an approach to preclusion could mean that litigants will be bound by what
happened in litigation to which they were not parties. 24 1 Although applying
preclusion might serve the goals of treating past and future litigants consistently,
"[t]he application of claim and issue preclusion to nonparties . .. runs up against
the 'deep-rooted historic tradition that everyone should have his own day in
242
court."'

Hierarchical stare decisis can create a similar problem insofar as it would
mandate that future litigants are bound by an earlier decision in which they had
no opportunity to participate. 243 Admittedly, this is also the case when stare

applied 'equally' or 'consistently' or 'uniformly' means simply that the rule should be applied
to the cases to which it applies.").
239 Alexander, supra note 7, at 10; see also Peters, supra note 237, at 2036 ("What
good
can come of a rule that prescribes consistency even at the expense of justice?").
240 See, e.g., Arthur R. Miller, Simplified Pleading, Meaningful
Days in Court, and Trials
on the Merits:Reflections on the Deformation ofFederalProcedure, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 286,
312 (2013) (describing "the due process underpinnings of the day-in-court principle");
Lawrence B. Solum, ProceduralJustice, 78 S. CAL. L. REv. 181, 274-89 (2004) (describing
the "value of participation" as "essential for the normative legitimacy of adjudication
processes").
241 See, e.g., Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 892 (2008) ("A person who was not a party
to a suit generally has not had a 'full and fair opportunity to litigate' the claims and issues
settled in that suit."); see also Smith v. Bayer Corp., 564 U.S. 299, 313 (2011) ("We have
repeatedly 'emphasize[d] the fundamental nature of the general rule' that only parties can be
bound by prior judgments . . . ." (quoting Taylor, 553 U.S. at 898)).
242 Taylor, 553 U.S. at 892-93 (quoting Richards v. Jefferson Cty., 517 U.S. 793, 798
(1996)). Accordingly, in situations where absent parties might face preclusive effects, the
justice system insists on a host of specialized procedures to protect those interests. In any
class action, for example, the court must make an explicit finding that the class representatives
"will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the [absent class members]." FED. R. Civ.
P. 23(a)(4).
243 See Steinman, supranote 13, at 1789 (pointing out that modem litigant would be bound
by decision in 1938 Supreme Court case).
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decisis effect is given to an earlier decision's explicitly stated, generalizable
rules. In that situation, however, the precedent-setting court has consciously
determined that "the applicable rule of law" should be "settled" in a
generalizable way. 244 And even then, future litigants may invoke the authority
245
of lower courts to distinguish such rules-as discussed above -when their
situation is one that the precedent-setting court might not have anticipated in
formulating the initial rule.
Even if one accepts the view that goals of consistency and equal treatment
should take precedence over other considerations, practical concerns would
remain. As described earlier, the seemingly modest notion of a "facts-plusoutcomes" obligation can be quite problematic in practice. 246 How, for example,
do future courts identify the full universe of facts that comprise the earlier case?
Further, should it be permissible to avoid the facts-plus-outcome obligation by
pointing to factual differences that are-in Justice Scalia's words-"accurate247
in-fact" but "inconsequential-in-principle"?
Efforts to infer obligations from aspects of judicial decisions other than
explicitly stated rules are sometimes framed in terms of what the judges in the
precedent-setting case "meant" or "intended," 248 or as a prediction of how those
249
This
same judges (should they sit on a superior court) will act in the future.
endeavor, however, carries with it significant risks of error or misattribution. A
facts-plus-outcome obligation, for example, assumes that the precedent-setting
court meant to impose the rule that "if these facts are present, then the court must
reach this outcome"--even when the court has not stated that rule explicitly. If
that is indeed the rule that the precedent-setting court believes is justified and
desirable, this Article's framework gives it the ability to declare it. A facts-plusoutcome obligation, however, effectively overrides the court's decision not to
articulate such a rule. 250 It is one thing for a court to recognize that a prior case
fails to resolve a particular question and to deploy whatever tools and

244 See Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting).
245
246

See supra Section III.C.2.
See supra notes 116-19 and accompanying text.

247 Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm'n, 135 S. Ct. 2652, 2696
(2015) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
248

See, e.g., United States v. Olivares-Rangel, 458 F.3d 1104, 1111 (10th Cir. 2006) ("We

do not believe the Supreme Court intended Lopez-Mendoza to be given such a reading.");
Campbell v. Clinton, 203 F.3d 19, 22 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (noting that court heard "extensive
argument ... as to exactly what the Supreme Court meant by a claim that a legislator's vote
was completely 'nullified"' and that it was "not readily apparent what the Supreme Court
meant by that word").
249 See, e.g., Dorf, supra note 26, at 654-55 (describing "a prediction-based model of law"
but arguing that "the prediction approach undermines the rule of law").
250 See supra notes 180-81 and accompanying text (observing that the decision to declare
a rule should be informed by potential decision costs and error costs).
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philosophies are available to best answer it. It is quite another to mistakenly read
a prior case as having answered a question in a particular way when the prior
case did not actually do so.
This is of more than merely academic concern. Some of the problematic
consequences of the Supreme Court's recent decisions on civil procedure may
be traced to misperceptions of what obligations those decisions actually impose
on courts going forward. In the Iqbal decision, the generalizable rules the Court
stated were not inherently controversial. 251 What proved to be so destabilizing
was the Court's ultimate conclusion that the key allegations in Iqbal's complaint
did not need to be accepted on their face at the pleading phase. 25 2 That
conclusion was very difficult to square with well-established aspects of the
federal pleading standard, even though the Court provided no explanation for
why Iqbal's allegations were so "conclusory" that they could be disregarded. 253
The same might be said for the non-syllogistic elements of a court's decision.
As explained earlier, these are the reasons a court provides for adopting a
particular if-then principle to decide the case before it, or for making a particular
finding (the (P) that combines with the if-then rule to generate the conclusion
(Q)). 254 By assumption, however, the court has not declared any generalizable
rule that makes those reasons part of a generalizable test that drives a particular

251 See Steinman, supra note 13, at 1756-58 (observing that "the notion that conclusory
allegations can be disregarded when determining the sufficiency of a complaint ... is not an
inherently radical idea" and that "the explicit rules that Iqbal endorsed are not inherently
problematic or destabilizing of the Court's long-standing approach to pleading"); id. at 1760
("[T]he notion that courts may disregard conclusory allegations at the pleadings phase can be

applied congruently with-and no more stringently than-the requirement that the complaint

must provide 'fair notice' of what the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.");
Steinman, supra note 109, at 354-55 (arguing that Iqbal's "plausibility" inquiry might be
interpreted to "perform a number of functions that do not invite the troubling consequences
that would flow from a more restrictive reading").
252 See Steinman, supra note 13, at 1758 ("What is most troubling about Iqbal is its
ultimate finding that the key allegations in Mr. Iqbal's complaint were conclusory and,
therefore, not entitled to an assumption of truth at the pleadings phase.").
253

Id. at 1759 ("Iqbal's rejection of the allegations ...

is difficult to square with the legal

framework that remains in place, including prior Supreme Court decisions that remain good

law .... If there is a rule that explains why these allegations pass muster but the ones in Iqbal
do not, Justice Kennedy did not provide it."). Another example of this dynamic is Wal-Mart
Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 345 (2011), which addressed Rule 23(a)(2)'s requirement
that a class action may only be certified if "there are questions of law or fact common to the

class." FED. R. Crv. P. 23(a)(2). What was so puzzling and destabilizing about the majority's
reasoning in that case was not the Court's articulation of the general principles governing
Rule 23(a)(2)'s common-question requirement, but rather the Court's ultimate conclusion that
the class action in that case did not present "any common question." Wal-Mart, 564 U.S. at
359; see also Steinman, supra note 13, at 1751-53, 1760-66.
254

See supra Section III.A.2 (discussing non-syllogistic elements of judicial opinions).
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outcome. If such a generalizable rule were justified and desirable, then the court
could state such a rule explicitly and that rule would have stare decisis effect.
In the Iqbal decision, for example, the Court justified its decision in part by
emphasizing the burdens of pretrial discovery on defendants in civil cases and
questioning the ability of judges to mitigate those burdens after the pleadings
phase by managing the discovery process. 255 Iqbal did not articulate, however,
any if-then principle that either makes discovery costs a factor in the pleading
analysis or requires courts to give special consideration to discovery burdens
going forward. In Roper, the Court cited several international agreements
prohibiting capital punishment for juvenile offenders. 256 Yet the Court did not
impose a generalizable rule that the content of such treaties dictated a particular
conclusion regarding the constitutional claims in that case. The fact that the
discovery process can impose costs on litigants does not mean that all procedural
decisions should be driven exclusively by the need to reduce those costs. The
fact that international treaties would forbid a particular government action does
not mean that all constitutional decisions must mirror the content of such
treaties.
This is the core shortcoming with any attempt to give binding effect to aspects
of a decision other than explicitly declared rules: future courts, by necessity, will
be guessing about how those components are binding as a matter of stare decisis.
A treatise on judicial precedent written by federal judges instructs that "if you're
not quite sure about what the opinion really means, you may want to question
just how binding this precedent should be." 257 Perhaps, however, we need to
rethink which parts ofa judicial opinion should be binding in the first place. One
way to avoid uncertainty about what an opinion "really means" is to reject the
notion that future courts must infer concrete obligations from aspects of an
opinion that are not explicitly stated, generalizable decisional rules. 258 Indeed,
this approach is arguably more faithful to the precedent-setting court itself. It
takes seriously the idea that courts make conscious decisions about what
prospective obligations are justified and desirable, and it refuses to impose stare
decisis obligations beyond those that the precedent-setting court explicitly
articulated.
Speaking more generally, to extract binding obligations from aspects of
decisions other than explicitly stated rules risks both unintended stare decisis
and unearned stare decisis. With respect to pleading standards, for example, the
2 59
Iqbal decision has had a significant empirical effect on courts and litigants.
Yet the decision itself may have been motivated simply by a result-driven desire

255 See supra notes

160-62 and accompanying text.
256 See supra note 153 and accompanying text.
257 GARNER ET AL., supra note 8, at 156.
258 See Steinman, supra note 13, at 1784 (criticizing "the idea that future courts are
obligated to infer additional unarticulated constraints from the result of the precedent-setting
decision in and of itself" (emphasis omitted)).
259 See Steinman, supra note 109, at 349-50.
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to end a particular lawsuit that sought monetary damages from the two highestranking federal law enforcement officials based on their response to "a national
and international security emergency unprecedented in the history of the
American Republic." 260
Ideally, the Justices in the Iqbal majority, recognizing the future stare decisis
effect of their decision, would have applied the federal pleading standard more
evenhandedly; they would have known that their treatment of the Iqbal
complaint would be applied prospectively to plaintiffs with less controversial
claims. 26 1 Yet, that did not happen. The Court dismissed Iqbal's complaint, and
many lower courts inferred that Iqbal compelled a newly restrictive pleading
standard 262-even though the general rules the Court articulated could have fit
into a more lenient, notice-pleading approach. 263 This is unintended stare decisis
in a nutshell; it is bad enough that Iqbal himself suffered from a problematic
application of pleading standards, but to compound the prospective effects of
that decision via stare decisis only makes things worse. 264 Indeed, imposing a
stricter pleading standard across the board does not appear to have been what
the Justices in the Iqbal majority were seeking to accomplish (or at least not all
of them). 265
The problem of unearned stare decisis flows from the fact that many
contentious issues have a strong ideological valence. Continuing with the
example of pleading standards, judges may have preferences regarding how easy
it should be for private parties to access judicial remedies for violations of
substantive law.266 Painting with an admittedly broad brush, the conventional

260 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 685 (2009) (quoting Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143, 14748 (2d Cir. 2007)); see also Steinman, supranote 140, at 1299 (calling Iqbala "result-oriented

decision[] designed to terminate at the earliest possible stage" a lawsuit that the majority

found "undesirable").
261 See Steinman, supra note 13, at 1786.
262 See Steinman, supra note 109, at 349-50.
263
264

See id. at 351-55 (reconciling Iqbalwith notice pleading).
This concern mirrors those described in the earlier discussion of stare decisis and the

values of equality and consistency. See supra notes 237-39 and accompanying text.
265

More recent Supreme Court decisions on pleading-which were joined by at least some

of the Justices in the Iqbalmajority-reflect an approach that is consistent with a more lenient,

notice-pleading paradigm. See Steinman, supra note 109, at 367-80 (citing, e.g., Johnson v.
City of Shelby, 135 S. Ct. 346 (2014)).
266 See

STEPHEN BURBANK

&

SEAN FARHANG,

RIGHTS

AND

RETRENCHMENT:

THE

COUNTERREVOLUrION AGAINST FEDERAL LITIGATION 135-38 (2017) (describing importance

of pleading standards to private enforcement of substantive law); Stephen B. Burbank & Sean
Farhang, LitigationReform: An InstitutionalApproach, 162 U. PA. L. REv. 1543, 1604 (2014)

(same); id. at 1606-12 (describing different Justices' voting records on issues relating to
private enforcement).
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wisdom is that conservative judges prefer less access to courts and progressive
judges prefer more access. 267
On this account, a hypothetical conservative judge in a precedent-setting case
on pleading standards may be inclined to rule in favor of the defendant,
regardless of whether that judge has a generalizable principle that justifies why
that complaint in that particular case should be dismissed. Perversely, extending
stare decisis beyond explicitly stated rules can give such an unprincipled
decision even more sweeping precedential effect. Future courts will be obligated
to decide future cases consistent with that facts-plus-outcome data point, or with
other reasons that the court was unable to distill into an acceptable generalizable
principle-even if the true driver for the decision was little more than a general
preference that access to courts should be more difficult. 268

For these reasons, there are significant downsides to an approach to stare
decisis that imposes obligations on future courts with respect to the "facts-plusoutcome" data points of earlier decisions, or to the various reasons a court
provides in the course of its opinion that are not stated explicitly as generalizable
rules. But this is not to say that these other aspects of precedent-setting decisions
are completely worthless. Lawyers, judges, and scholars would surely continue
to invoke them for their persuasive value. It can strengthen one's case to say: "I
am arguing for position X, and here is how the result reached in an earlier case
is consistent with that position." Or: "You are arguing for position Y, and here
is how that position conflicts with the reasons invoked by the court in an earlier
case." These aspects of judicial decisions might be precedential in a looser,
nonbinding sense-giving comfort to decision makers that a particular decision
is consistent with prior cases. 269 Recognizing the force of such arguments,
however, is different than insisting that those aspects of prior decisions generate
binding case law.
Moreover, it is possible that other aspects of precedent-setting decisions
might, in the common law tradition, 270 be instructive evidence of what the law
is or ought to be. They might also be significant under certain philosophies
267 See Burbank & Farhang, supra note 266, at 1607-08 ("Dividing
the Justices into
conservatives and liberals . .. demonstrates that it again effectively predicts whether a Justice
is above or below the median ratio of pro-private enforcement votes in Federal Rules cases.").
But cf Lee Epstein, William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, How Business Fares in the
Supreme Court, 97 MiNN. L. REv. 1431, 1433 (2013) (distinguishing between "social
conservatives" and libertarians, who are "conservative in business").
268 With respect to multi-member courts (like the Supreme Court), the lack of an explicitly
articulated rule may reflect the fact that the proponent of a particular rule could not garner a
majority to support it.
269 See, e.g., Steinman, supra note 13, at 1772 (noting that "[j]udges may find it inherently
desirable to find support in aspects of prior decisions even if they are not bound to do so, and
judges may believe their opinions will be better received (by whatever audience) if they can
invoke and claim consistency with nonbinding aspects of prior decisions").
270 See supra Section L.A (distinguishing "common law" variant of case law from

hierarchical stare decisis).
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regarding the best way to decide cases. 271 But they might not. In denying stare
decisis effect to everything that is not an explicitly stated, generalizable rule, this
Article's approach would simply leave the slate clean for future litigants and
future courts.
Some Thoughts on Qualified Immunity and Habeas Corpus
In most instances, reducing the extent to which prior decisions are binding in
future cases is more empowering to the litigants and judges in those future cases.
To say that there is no binding obligation to follow certain kinds of reasons
expressed in prior decisions, or to reconcile decisions with the facts-plusoutcome data points of prior decisions, does not prevent future courts from
acting consistently with those prior decisions. Yet it gives future courts the
freedom to decide cases independently of those aspects of prior decisions, and it
gives future litigants the freedom to argue that those aspects of prior decisions
are incorrect.
Thus, an approach to stare decisis that clearly places certain aspects of prior
decisions in the nonbinding category can only increase the universe of
permissible approaches in a given future case. 272 Normatively, greater leeway is
arguably a good thing:
Given the decision costs and error costs inherent in any particular judicial
opinion, it is better to have the later court confront the relevant issues
independently and on their own merits, rather than to seek some kind of
cryptic consistency with results or reasons that lack the hallmarks of
273
consciously-made prospective legal principles.
There are some situations, however, where it might matter whether a
particular rule or result in a given case is compelled by earlier precedent, as
opposed to being simply the correct rule or result based on the court's
independent assessment. Two crucial examples of this are habeas corpus and
qualified immunity. To obtain habeas relief from a state court conviction or
sentence, a party must show that the state court's handling of the federal claim
"was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established
3.

271
272

See supra notes 26-28 and accompanying text.
As I have written elsewhere:

When a party prevails because the court follows a particular rule, it does not matter
whether the court is adopting that rule independently, or the court believes that the rule
is compelled by an earlier decision. And it does not matter whether the court reaches its
ultimate conclusion independently, or reaches that conclusion because it feels bound to
do so by the results or reasons expressed in earlier decisions. This is the nature of the
judicial process. Courts can develop and apply rules during the course of litigation, and
this development and application is retrospectively imposed on the parties to that
litigation-regardless of whether they had been clearly articulated in advance.
Steinman, supra note 13, at 1807.
273 Id.
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Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States." 274
Qualified immunity shields government officials from liability for damages
unless the official violated a right that was "clearly established at the time of the
challenged conduct." 275 In both situations, it is not enough that the current court
would find that the state court's or the government official's conduct violated
federal law.
At first glance, an approach to stare decisis that gives future courts greater
leeway would also seem to give greater deference to the courts and officials who
benefit from habeas standards and qualified immunity. On this view, reducing
the extent to which earlier decisions "clearly establish" the content of federal
law could make it very difficult for a habeas petitioner or civil rights plaintiff to
overcome deferential habeas review or qualified immunity.
This concern, however, overlooks another important aspect of both doctrines.
The habeas statute allows relief if the state court's application of clearly
established federal law is "unreasonable."27 6 And qualified immunity can be
overcome only if a "reasonableofficial would understand that what he is doing
violates [the clearly established] right."2 77 In a world where hierarchical stare
decisis followed the approach developed in this Article, the reasonableness
inquiry required by qualified immunity and the habeas statute would play a more
important role. Although this Article's proposal could make it harder in some
instances to show that conduct by a state court or government official violated
"clearly established" law, there would still be room to argue that the state court's
decision was an "unreasonable" application of that law, or that no "reasonable"
official could conclude that his conduct violated the clearly established right.278
V.

ADDITIONAL BENEFITS OF AN EXPLICIT-RULES
APPROACH TO STARE DECISIS

This Part explains how this Article's approach to stare decisis would help to
resolve several long-standing puzzles relating to judicial decision-making.
Section A addresses the problem of tensions within case law, including questions
regarding the process of overruling, distinguishing, and narrowing earlier

274

28 U.S.C.

§ 2254(d)(1) (2012).

E.g., Reichle v. Howards, 566 U.S. 658, 664 (2012) (citing Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563
U.S. 731, 735 (2011)).
276 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (emphasis added).
275

277
278

Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987) (emphasis added).
"While reasonableness review entails some deference to the earlier decision maker, it

is not a blank check." Steinman, supra note 13, at 1808. In many areas of law, judicial
inquiries into "reasonableness" give courts considerable authority to second-guess decisions
that are supposedly being reviewed only for whether they are reasonable. See id. at 1808-09
(describing judicial consideration-in the context of motions for summary judgment and
motions for judgment as a matter of law-of whether a particular jury verdict was, or would
be, "reasonable" on a given evidentiary record (citing FED. R. Civ. P. 50(a)(1), 56; Anderson
v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986))).
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decisions. Section B explains how this Article's framework would clarify
persistent uncertainty regarding the stare decisis effect of non-majority
opinions-including the so-called Marks rule. 279 Section C discusses questions
scholars have raised about the stare decisis effect of what are known as
"legislative facts." Section D considers the controversy surrounding unpublished
appellate court opinions, and describes how this Article's approach would make
it unnecessary for courts to declare certain opinions to be non-precedential. And
Section E identifies some additional open questions about stare decisis regarding
biconditionals, decisions that address multiple issues, and interpretive
methodology. Although this Article does not propose a definitive answer to these
questions, this Article's framework would provide a foundation for addressing
them going forward.
A.

Tensions Within Case Law

How to conceptualize tensions between judicial decisions is a difficult
question, which has different implications depending on whether it arises in the
context of vertical stare decisis (a lower court creating tension with a higher
court decision) or horizontal stare decisis (a court creating tension with its own
decision). At least in the horizontal context, courts have some ability to overrule
earlier decisions. 280 It might not always be clear, however, when a particular
decision in Case Two would require overruling Case One. 2 8 1
Under the framework developed here, a court would need to overrule an
earlier decision only in the following situations:
* Case One established the rule (If P, then Q). Case Two wishes to
establish that (If P, then Q) is legally incorrect. 282 Case Two would
have to explicitly overrule Case One.
* Case One established that the rule (If P, then Q) is legally incorrect.
Case Two wishes to establish (If P, then Q) as a correct rule. Case
Two would have to explicitly overrule Case One.
* Case One established that, in the event of a conflict, the rule (If X,
then Not-Q) takes priority over the rule (If P, then Q). Case Two
wishes to establish that (If P, then Q) takes priority over (If X, then
Not-Q). Case Two would have to explicitly overrule Case One.
Because these situations would require an explicit overrule, these moves
would only be available with respect to horizontal stare decisis. A lower court
See Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) (discussed infra notes 305-06
and accompanying text).
279

280 See supra note 81 and accompanying text (discussing ability of courts to overturn their

own decisions).
281 See Steinman, supra note 13, at 1755 (noting that whether overruling is necessary

"depends on what law the earlier decision has made").
282 As discussed supra Section III.D.2, stare decisis should allow a court to declare that a
particular if-then rule is not the law-in other words, that future courts must not employ that
rule to decide future cases.
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could not make any of the three moves described above vis-A-vis the decision of
a higher court. Even in the horizontal context, of course, there may be significant
disagreement about whether sufficient grounds exist to overrule an earlier
decision. The Supreme Court has identified various "prudential and pragmatic
283
considerations" that should inform whether case law ought to be overruled.
Put simply, "reexamining the prior law" requires a justification stronger than "a
present doctrinal disposition to come out differently." 2 8 4 As a threshold matter,
however, it is helpful to have a clear understanding of when such overruling is
even necessary. This Article's framework would provide that understanding.
What about implicit overrules? Briefly stated, an implicit overrule occurs
when two cases are in such tension that a court should conclude that the latter
case implicitly overruled the earlier one.285 More precisely, the implicit-overrule
scenario necessarily involves three cases: Case Three must decide whether it is
no longer bound by Case One because Case Two implicitly overruled Case One.
Whether the court in Case Three should have the power to declare such an
implicit overrule is controversial. 286 Indeed, the Supreme Court has instructed
lower courts that they should never conclude for themselves that the Court has
implicitly overruled one of its earlier decisions. 287
This Article's approach would eliminate the need to inquire whether an
implicit overrule has occurred. Suppose Case One established Rule One and
Case Two established Rule Two. The court in Case Three would not need to
decide whether Case Two implicitly overruled Case One. It would only need to
address an open question regarding which rule takes priority when Rule One and
Rule Two dictate opposing conclusions in a particular case. Even a lower court
might be required to make that priority determination, although appellate review
would allow the precedent-setting higher court to decide whether the lower court
ranked the rules properly.
In the context of horizontal stare decisis (say, Case One and Case Two are
Supreme Court cases, and the Supreme Court is now deciding Case Three),
additional options may be available. The Supreme Court might decide that

Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854 (1992).
284 Id. at 864 (declining to overrule prior holding "[b]ecause neither the factual
underpinnings of [the prior case]'s central holding nor [the Court's] understanding of it has
283

changed").
285 See, e.g., Steinman, supra note 109, at 359-63 (describing courts that have examined
whether Iqbal implicitly overruled Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506 (2002), with
respect to federal pleading standards).
286 See, e.g., Dunn, supra note 34, at 520-25 ("This act of implicit overruling relieves the
Court of responsibility at every point in the process."); Christopher J. Peters, Under-the-Table
Overruling, 54 WAYNE L. REv. 1067, 1072 (2008) ("What makes these decisions troubling,
however, is not that [the Supreme Court] changed doctrine, but that they did so without
admitting it.").
287 See Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 237 (1997) (rejecting the view that "other courts
should conclude our more recent cases have, by implication, overruled an earlier precedent").
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having Rule One and Rule Two coexist is not justified or desirable. Indeed, the
tension between Rule One and Rule Two may strengthen the argument that Case
One (and Rule One) should be overruled. 288 At this point, however, the Supreme
Court can do so explicitly-it can decide in Case Three to overrule Case One,
by declaring (as discussed above) that Rule One is not the law. Because the
Court in Case Three can overrule Case One explicitly, there is no need to declare
that Case Two had overruled Case One implicitly.
Many of the instances where courts discuss implicit overrules do not involve
tensions between explicitly stated rules. Rather, we ask whether Case Two has
implicitly overruled Case One because we cannot reconcile those decisions on
facts-plus-outcomes grounds; that is, we cannot understand how Case One found
Pi and Case Two found Not-P 2. 2 89 Or we see tensions in the non-syllogistic
reasons provided in Case One and Case Two. 290 Because those aspects of
judicial decisions would not have binding stare decisis effect under this Article's
framework, there would be no need to address whether an implicit overrule has
occurred. The law is left open for future courts to decide future cases with the
full participation of future litigants and to consider whether to declare (or to
reject) any generalizable rules.
This Article's approach to stare decisis would also resolve a concern that has
arisen in scholarly attempts to conceptualize the process of distinguishing cases.
It is often said that when a court distinguishes an earlier case, it is amending or
modifying the rule stated in the earlier case. Considering the relationship
between Miranda and Harris,291 Professor Richard Re wrote that Harris
"interpreted Miranda so that it prohibited only the use of certain statements in
the prosecution's affirmative case," and therefore "narrowed Miranda'sbroad
statement." 292 A treatise on judicial precedent describes the process of
distinguishing cases more formulaically: "[I]f the reasoning in a former case

288 See, e.g., id. at 236 ("[S]tare decisis may yield where a prior decision's 'underpinnings
[have been] eroded, by subsequent decisions of this Court."' (alteration in original) (quoting
United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 521 (1995))).
289 See supra note 128 (explaining the nomenclature that the case-specific finding that P
is true in that case is Pa).
290 See Steinman, supra note 13, at 1791 n.314 (describing how apparent inconsistencies
between Supreme Court cases on class certification and pleading might give rise to arguments
that later cases have implicitly overruled earlier ones).
291 See supranotes 191-94 and accompanying
text.
292 Re, supra note 7, at 933-34. Re's recent work draws a distinction between
distinguishing and narrowing precedent. See id. at 928-29. On Re's account, Court Two
distinguishes Case One when Court Two's decision contrary to the result in Case One is the
"best" reading of Case One. See id. Court Two narrows Case One when Court Two's decision
contrary to the result in Case One is consistent with a "reasonable" (but not the "best") reading
of Case One. Id. at 927-28.
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court may provide
might once have appeared to be 'if A, B, C, then X,' a later
2 93
that the rule should now be 'if A, B, C, and D, then X."'
One problem with this conventional understanding is that it risks conflating
distinguishing cases and overruling cases. Even an inferior court may distinguish
a higher court precedent. Yet if distinguishing involves a lower court reaching
up the judicial hierarchy to change the higher court's rule, it makes the process
of distinguishing look a lot like an overrule (albeit a partial one) by the lower
court. The conventional wisdom may evade this charge by saying that the rule
of the original case was dicta-it was not "necessary" in that it was stated more
broadly than was needed to decide the precedent-setting case. 294 This line of
argument proves too much, however-as discussed above, it undermines the
notion that any judicially declared rule can be binding as a matter of stare
decisis. 295
This Article's approach offers a way out of this thicket. As developed earlier,
courts may distinguish the rule declared by an earlier precedent (IfP, then Q) by
declaring a distinguishing rule (If X, then Not-Q). 296 This does not purport to
change the initial rule. It simply provides a new rule to deal with the specific
situation (X). 2 9 7 While the logical consequence is ultimately the same for the
case where the distinction is made, this approach conceptualizes the process
more cleanly. We need not label Miranda's stated rule as "dicta" 298 (or as not
"necessary" to the Court's decision). 299 We need not conclude that Harris
"overruled" Miranda-either implicitly or explicitly. 300 Nor do we need to
declare that Harris revised the "rule" of Miranda. Miranda's rule is still
Miranda'srule; Harris'srule is Harris'srule. Harrissimply establishes that in
cases where the two rules generate conflicting conclusions, the Harrisrule takes
priority.
Accordingly, this Article's framework simplifies how we think about
resolving potential tensions between cases. In the context of horizontal stare
decisis, a court may explicitly overrule an earlier decision-either by declaring
Case One's rule to be incorrect, by adopting a rule that Case One had declared

293 GARNER ET AL., supra note 8, at 97; see also RAZ, supra note 137, at 185

(describing

the "power to distinguish" as the power to "change the rule" from "when A, B, C, then
X.. . into A, B, C, E, then X'); Alexander, supra note 7, at 24 ("If the precedent court declares

that in all cases with facts A, B, and C the decision shall be X, then narrowing the rule takes
the form of amending it to hold that, for example, in all cases of A, B, C, and not D the
decision shall be X.").
294 See supra notes 89-92 and accompanying text.

295 See supra notes 93-97 and accompanying text.
296 See supra Section III.C.2.

Put another way, this approach recognizes that the initial rule is defeasible. See supra
note 196.
298 See supra notes 100-06 and accompanying text (discussing holding-dicta distinction).
299 See supra notes 89-92 and accompanying text.
3 See supra notes 286-88 and accompanying text.
297
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to be incorrect, or by reversing Case One's earlier finding about the priority
between rules. In the context of either horizontal or vertical stare decisis, the
court may distinguish cases by declaring distinguishing rules.
B.

Non-Majority Opinions

Another long-standing puzzle is how to determine the stare decisis effect of
decisions that lack a majority opinion. This is a challenge that dates back to the
centuries-old tradition of issuing seriatim opinions, where each judge on a multimember panel wrote a separate opinion in the case. 301 In modern practice, judges
strive to generate an "Opinion of the Court" that garners a majority. On the
Supreme Court, that means five Justices. 302
That aspiration is not always achievable, of course. Sometimes decisions fail
to generate a majority opinion. 303 For decades, the precedential effect of such
decisions has been governed by a rule attributed to Marks v. United States:304
"When a fragmented Court decides a case and no single rationale explaining the
result enjoys the assent of five Justices, 'the holding of the Court may be viewed
as that position taken by those Members who concurred in the judgments on the
narrowest grounds . ... "'305 In practice, however, courts applying the Marks
rule have often found themselves "baffled and divided." 306
One problem with the Marks rule is this: how exactly do we measure which
position is the "narrowest"? 307 This Article's approach to stare decisis provides
a straightforward way to think about this question. Consider the Supreme
301 See, e.g., DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPRElIE COURT: THE FIRST

HUNDRED YEARS, 1789-1888, at 14 (1985) (discussing how "each Justice delivered his own"

opinion in Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793)).
302 See, e.g., Abner Mikva, The Scope of Equal Protection, 2002 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 1, 8
("[A]s the late Justice Brennan used to say, the first rule of the Supreme Court is that you have
to be able to count to five."). In cases where the Court does not have its full complement of
nine Justices, it is possible for less than five Justices to constitute a majority. Compare

Mitchell v. Tennessee, 351 F. Supp. 846, 847 (W.D. Tenn. 1972) (criticizing but noting that
it was "bound to follow" the "four judges who comprised the Supreme Court majority in the

Fuentes case" (citing Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972))), with Roofing Wholesale Co.
v. Palmer, 502 P.2d 1327, 1330 (Ariz. 1972) (refusing to follow Fuentes because it was
decided by "less than a clear majority").
303 See generallyJ. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873 (2011) (three opinions,

no majority opinion); Montana v. Englehoff, 518 U.S. 37 (1996) (five opinions, no majority
opinion); Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (six opinions, no majority
opinion).
304 430 U.S. 188 (1977).

305 Id. at 193 (emphasis added) (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 n.15 (1976)
(opinion of Stewart, Powell & Stevens, JJ.)).
306 Nichols v. United States, 511 U.S. 738, 746 (1994); accord Grutter v. Bollinger, 539
U.S. 306, 325 (2003).
307 See, e.g., Williams, supra note 7, at 806-07 (describing disagreements over applying

Marks rule).
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Court's decision in Shady Grove Orthopedic Associates v. Allstate Insurance
Co. 3 0 8 One of the key issues in Shady Grove was whether it would violate the
Rules Enabling Act ("REA") to allow Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure to permit a class action, despite a provision of New York law that
would forbid such a class action had the case been brought in a New York
court. 309

The REA provides that a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure "shall not abridge,
enlarge or modify any substantive right." 310 The Court split 5-4, with the
majority concluding that applying Rule 23 would not violate the REA. 3 11 Within
that majority, however, Justice Scalia spoke for four Justices regarding the
REA's substantive-rights provision and Justice Stevens authored a lone
concurring opinion on that issue. 312
Justice Scalia's plurality opinion used the following rule: If a Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure really regulates procedure (A), then it is valid under the REA
(X) (IfA, then X). 3 13
Justice Stevens's concurring opinion used the following rule: If a Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure both really regulates procedure (A) and does not displace
a state law that is so intertwined with a state right or remedy that defines the
scope of the state-created right (B), then it is valid under the REA (X) (If both A
3 14
and B, then X).

All five of the Justices in the majority found that the antecedent conditions of
their rules were satisfied, which is why they all agreed that applying Rule 23
was valid (X). As for the rules themselves, Justice Stevens's rule is narrower
because the universe of cases that would satisfy Justice Stevens's antecedent
condition (Both A and B) is smaller than the universe of cases that would satisfy
Justice Scalia's antecedent condition (A). That is, cases where both (A) and (B)
are true comprise a subset of all of the cases where (A) is true. Thus, Justice

308

559 U.S. 393 (2010).

309 Id. at 396; see also Adam N. Steinman, Our Class Action Federalism: Erie and the
Rules EnablingAct After Shady Grove, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1131, 1137-43 (2011).

28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (2012).
" See Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 399.

310

312 See id. at 416 (Stevens, J., concurring).

313 See id. at 407 (plurality opinion) (citing Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 14

(1941)) (holding that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure "must 'really regulat[e] procedure,the judicial process for enforcing rights and duties recognized by substantive law and for
justly administering remedy and redress for disregard or infraction of them"' (alteration in

original)).
314 See id. at 423 (Stevens, J., concurring) ("A federal rule, therefore, cannot govern a

particular case in which the rule would displace a state law that is procedural in the ordinary
use of the term but is so intertwined with a state right or remedy that it functions to define the
scope of the state-created right.").
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Stevens's rule (If both A and B, then X) would be the narrowest ground under
Marks, and that rule would be established as a matter of stare decisis.31 5
Note, however, that adopting Justice Stevens's narrower rule would not
necessarily entail rejecting Justice Scalia's broader rule. As explained above,
this Article's approach to stare decisis treats adopting rules and rejecting rules
as separate lawmaking events. 316 Thus, Shady Grove would not establish that
Justice Scalia's rule is legally incorrect. In some hypothetical future case where
a Federal Rule really regulates procedure but is so intertwined with a state right
or remedy that defines the scope of the state-created right (that is, a case where
A is satisfied but B is not), future courts could address on a clean slate whether
Justice Scalia's rule is correct.
A similar line of argument could identify the stare decisis effect of decisions
where no faction within the majority articulates a rule that is identifiably the
"narrowest." Imagine that three of the concurring Justices use the rule (IfA, then
X), and two of the Justices use the rule (If B, then X). Neither of these rules is
necessarily narrower than the other, which makes the Marks approach
unworkable. Both rules, however, logically encompass the rule (If both A and B,
then X). And both factions would endorse the legal correctness of that rule-the
first would do so because (A) would be satisfied, and the second would do so
because (B) would be satisfied. 3 17

3Is

See, e.g., United States v. Robison, 521 F.3d 1319, 1323 (11th Cir. 2008) (recognizing

that Marks would apply "only in circumstances in which one Supreme Court opinion truly is
'narrower' than another-that is, where it is clear that one opinion would apply in a subset of

cases encompassed by a broader opinion"); King v. Palmer, 950 F.2d 771, 781 (D.C. Cir.
1991) (en banc) ("Marks is workable-one opinion can be meaningfully regarded as
'narrower' than another-only when one opinion is a logical subset of other, broader

opinions."). To be clear, saying that Justice Stevens's if-then rule is binding law is not to say
that the inverse of Justice Stevens's rule is binding law. See Abramowicz & Steams, supra

note 7, at 984 (defining the relationship between a proposition and its inverse). Justice Stevens
believed that in a case where (B) was not satisfied-because the Federal Rule would displace
a state law that is so intertwined with a state right or remedy that it defines the scope of the

state-created right-the Federal Rule could not be validly applied. More formulaically, Justice
Stevens's preferred rule was not only (If both A and B, then X), but also (If either Not-A or
Not-B, then Not-X). See infra notes 336-37 and accompanying text (discussing

"biconditional" rules that include both an if-then proposition and its inverse). Under the
framework proposed in this Article, the first of these rules would be established in a case like
Shady Grove, but the second of these is neither established nor rejected. In the parlance of
Marks, it is only the first of Justice Stevens's rules (If bothA and B, thenX) that is "narrowest"

as compared to Justice Scalia's rule.
316 See supra Section III.D.
317 This approach would operate much like the "shared agreement" approach recently

proposed by Professor Ryan Williams. See Williams, supra note 7, at 836-37 (arguing for
approach to non-majority opinions that would "look[] to the convergent reasoning of the
opinions that were collectively necessary to the precedent case judgment").
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As with the Shady Grove example, accepting that rule (If both A and B, then
X) would not constitute a rejection of any potentially broader rule-including
either (If A, then X) or (If B, then X).318 Thus, no binding law would be made
with respect to the areas of potential disagreement between the two factions (the
cases where (A) is true but (B) is not, and those where (B) is true but (A) is not).
Future courts, either lower or equal in the judicial hierarchy, would be free to
consider whether to accept or reject such alternative rules in future cases.
C.

Legislative Facts

One aspect of judicial decision-making that has garnered considerable
319
scholarly attention is the proper handling of "legislative facts." These are facts
that "do not usually concern the immediate parties but are the general facts
320
which help the tribunal decide questions of law and policy and discretion."
Professor Allison Orr Larsen's recent work observes that "U]udicial opinions are
full of these types of generalized facts such as: partial birth abortions are never
medically necessary, fleeing from the police in a car leads to fatalities, and
321
violent video games affect the neurological development of a child's brain."
How judges determine such legislative facts has been the focus of significant
criticism. Scholars have rightly raised concerns about judges going beyond the
evidence and arguments developed during the course of the litigation and basing
their decisions on information that has never been tested through the adversarial
process. 322 These critiques have prompted the related question of whether a
court's acceptance of such legislative facts should be binding on future courts as
a matter of stare decisis. 323

" Likewise, accepting the rule (If both A and B, then X) would not establish the inverse

of that rule (If either Not-A or Not-B, then Not-X). See supra note 315.
31 See, e.g., David L. Faigman, "Normative ConstitutionalFact-Finding":Exploring the
Empirical Component of Constitutional Interpretation, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 541, 552 (1991)

(distinguishing legislative facts from adjudicative facts); Larsen, supra note 7, at 71-73; supra
note 98 (describing disagreement between Judge Posner and Judge Easterbrook regarding
legislative facts and stare decisis).
320 Henry P. Monaghan, ConstitutionalFact Review, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 229, 231 n.16
(1985) (quoting 2 K. DAVIs, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 12:3, at 413 (2d ed. 1979));
see also Larsen, supra note 7, at 71 (defining a "legislative fact" as "a generalized fact about

the world, as opposed to a 'whodunit' fact relating to the parties before a court in any one
case").
321 Larsen, supra note 7, at 71 (footnotes omitted) (citing Brown v. Entm't Merchs. Ass'n,

131 S. Ct. 2729, 2768-69 (2011) (Breyer, J., dissenting); Sykes v. United States, 131 S. Ct.
2267, 2273 (2011); Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 141 (2007)).
322 See supra note 225 (surveying scholarship discussing problems with judicial research
and fact gathering beyond the record developed by the litigants).
323 See Larsen, supra note 7, at 97-103 (discussing the precedential weight or value that

should be given to legislative facts).
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Under conventional approaches to stare decisis, legislative facts might indeed
be binding insofar as they form part of the "rationale upon which the Court based
the results of its earlier decisions." 324 This Article's approach to stare decisis,
however, provides a clean way of identifying legislative facts and rendering
them nonbinding. Even if a court's decision is informed by the fact that "violent
video games affect the neurological development of a child's brain," 325 or that
"hindering the progress of the automobile industry will decrease the gross
national product of the United States," 326 or even that "Williamsburg is prettier
than Newark," 327 those propositions themselves do not state generalizable rules
that can be stated in if-then form. Under this Article's approach, therefore, they
would not create prospectively binding case law.
This understanding of stare decisis would not resolve the legitimate debate
about when judges should be relying on legislative facts based on outside
evidence or other questionable authority. That can remain problematic insofar
as it leads to errors in developing or applying the governing rules in a particular
case. But this Article's approach would at least eliminate uncertainty regarding
whether future courts are bound to accept the truth of those legislative facts as a
matter of hierarchical stare decisis.
D.

"Unpublished" Opinions

The vast majority of federal appellate decisions do not have precedential
effect. 32 8 Such decisions are often called "unpublished," 329 but given that they
are readily available through a variety of electronic sources, a more accurate
description is non-precedential. 330 However it is labeled, the practice has been
controversial for two central reasons. One is the perception that non-precedential
decisions receive short shrift in terms of both the appellate process and the depth
of attention and analysis judges give them. 331 The other is the deeper institutional

324
325

Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 66-67 (1996).
Larsen, supra note 7, at 71 (citing Sykes, 131 S. Ct. at 2273).

326 Schauer, supra note 174, at 460.
327
328

Id.
See Weisgerber, supra note 31, at 623-24 ("As of September 2007, over 80% of U.S.

courts of appeals opinions per year were unpublished.").
329

See sources cited supra note 31 (all referring to "unpublished opinions").

330 See Scott E. Gant, Missing the Forestfor a Tree: Unpublished Opinions and New

FederalRule ofAppellate Procedure32.1, 47 B.C. L. REv. 705, 710-12 (2006).
33 See, e.g., Vladeck & Gulati, supra note 31, at 1680 (noting the critique that "courts
have largely abandoned the cornerstones of appellate decision-making: full consideration of
all issues raised on appeal, adequate oral argument and briefing opportunities, well-reasoned
published dispositions, and direct involvement of Article III judges in every stage of the
process").
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question of whether judges should ever be able to issue decisions that have no
precedential effect. 332
As to the latter question, federal appellate courts instruct that a decision may
33 3
be unpublished only if it does not create new law or modify existing law. But
if one accepts the conventional view that every "facts-plus-outcome" data point
creates a binding obligation as a matter of stare decisis, it is hard to see how any
decision can genuinely be one that does not make new law. Every decision has
both "facts" and an "outcome," so by necessity every decision would create a
binding obligation in future decisions.
One potential feature of this Article's approach to stare decisis is to eliminate
the need for courts to designate certain opinions non-precedential. The only part
of a decision that creates binding case law would be the if-then principles that
the court uses to decide the case. So if the court deciding a case is employing ifthen rules that have already been adopted by that court in an earlier decision,
that decision is--quite literally-making no new law. There would be no need
to declare the decision to be non-precedential. If, on the other hand, the court
uses an if-then decisional rule that the court has not yet adopted, then that
33 4
decision ought to have precedential effect.
Under this framework, courts would have a clear choice. If a court does not
want to make new, binding law in a particular case, it would not need the
convenient escape of simply declaring an opinion to be non-precedential. Rather,
it could avoid making new law by not declaring any new rules in the course of
deciding the case. But if the court does declare new rules when deciding the
case, it should do so with the understanding that those rules will be binding in
future cases.
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See, e.g., Gant, supra note 330, at 707 (critiquing the view that appellate court judges

should "determine an opinion's precedential authority at the time they issue the opinion, based
on their view about whether that opinion has made 'new law' or is otherwise significant");
Weisgerber, supra note 31, at 633 ("[T]he Framers of the Constitution envisioned that
precedent would serve as a check on 'the judicial power,' thus giving the doctrine of precedent
constitutional status . . . ."). The constitutional critique gained momentum from a famous, but
ultimately vacated, opinion by Eighth Circuit Judge Richard Arnold, in which he found that
the Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure authorizing non-precedential decisions "expand[ed]
the judicial power beyond the limits set by Article III by allowing us complete discretion to
determine which judicial decisions will bind us and which will not." Anastasoff v. United
States, 223 F.3d 898, 905 (8th Cir.), vacated on reh'g en banc, 235 F.3d 1054 (8th Cir. 2000).
313 See, e.g., 9TH CIR. R. 36-2(a) (providing that an opinion shall be published if it
"[e]stablishes, alters, modifies or clarifies a rule of federal law").
334 A decision should also have precedential effect if it rejects a particular if-then rule in
the course of its decision, see supra Section III.D.2 (explaining that when a court rejects a
particular if-then rule, it "require[s] future courts not to employ that rule to decide future
cases"), or if it determines the priority of rules that would otherwise require opposing
conclusions, see supra text accompanying notes 197-98 (discussing priority rules when the
outcomes under two different rules conflict).
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Even if courts were not willing to give up their ability to label decisions nonprecedential, this Article's approach would clarify the appellate courts'
publication criteria. When an opinion does declare a new if-then rule in the
course of deciding a case, that opinion should be published and should create
binding case law with respect to that rule. Only opinions that do not declare (or
reject) any new if-then rules should be eligible for non-precedential status.
In considering the ramifications of this Article's approach for the practice of
issuing non-precedential decisions, I do not discount the legitimate concerns
about the extent to which federal appellate courts have adopted a two-tiered
approach to justice, with some cases receiving far less attention than others.
Non-precedential decisions are just one component of that troubling trend. But
so long as non-precedential decisions remain a part of contemporary appellate
practice, it is important to recognize the relationship between the use of nonprecedential decisions and the general rules for determining the lawmaking
content of appellate decisions.
E.

Some Open Questions

This Article's approach can also provide a lens for examining some additional
questions about the scope of stare decisis: (1) biconditional statements; (2)
decisions where the court addresses multiple issues; and (3) interpretive
methodology. Each of these issues are variants of the broader question of
whether particular parts of an opinion are "necessary" to the court's ultimate
decision-or under this Article's framing, whether there is a sufficient nexus
between the "case" and the "law" it generates as a matter of stare decisis.
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Article's framework does not make definitive proposals for how to handle these
three issues, although this framework would be consistent with a range of
possible solutions.
Unlike the conditional if-then statements that are the focus of this Article, a
biconditional statement "take[s] the form if-and-only-if rather than if-then." 336
Such if-and-only-if statements, however, are simply the combination of "both a
conditional statement (If P then Q) and its inverse (If Not-P, then Not-Q)." 337
Biconditionals are not uncommon. When courts formulate a test to govern a
particular issue, the test is often meant to determine both success and failure. 338

3 See supra Section III.D.
336 Steinman, supranote 13, at 1803 (emphasis omitted); see
also Abramowicz & Steams,

supra note 7, at 981-86 (discussing issue of whether biconditional statements should be
considered part of a case's holding).
337 Steinman, supra note 13, at 1803 (citing COPI ET AL., supra note 125, at 315).
13 As described above, for example, Justice Stevens's focus in Shady Grove on whether a
Federal Rule would displace a state law that is so intertwined with a state right or remedy that
it defines the scope of the state-created right was crucial for determining both validity and
invalidity. See supra note 315. Although Justice Stevens's syllogistic reasoning was that

applying Federal Rule 23 was valid because it did not displace such a state law, he also
reasoned that a rule would be invalid if it did displace such a law. For another example, see
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Here is the problem: Suppose that a precedent-setting court (1) declares a
biconditional legal rule (If and only if P, then Q); (2) finds that (P) is true; and
(3) therefore concludes (Q). The principle (If P, then Q) would certainly qualify
as "necessary" under this Article's approach. But arguably the other half of the
biconditional (If Not-P, then Not-Q) was not "necessary" because the court did
not actually use that principle to reach its ultimate conclusion. On the other hand,
it could be argued that "both halves of a biconditional statement" should be
binding insofar as the entire statement reflects the court "trying to offer a
339
The framework
comprehensive resolution to the relevant question presented."
recognize that
could
It
view.
either
proposed here could accommodate
are just
reasoning
syllogistic
the
court's
biconditional statements that are part of
340
to the
only
decisis
stare
limit
it
could
or
as binding as conditional statements,
decision.
in
its
uses
court
conditional statement that the
A second interesting puzzle is determining the stare decisis effect of decisions
34
where the court addresses multiple issues. 1 Suppose that (1) a case presents
two distinct issues; (2) the precedent-setting court decides both issues; and (3)
the court's resolution of one issue made it so the other issue could not have
changed the ultimate result. The Supreme Court's decision in National
342
Federationof Independent Business v. Sebelius ("NFIB"), which upheld the
Affordable Care Act ("ACA"), provides one illustration. Five Justices found that
the ACA's individual mandate was authorized by Congress's tax power, and five
Justices found that the ACA was not authorized by Congress's commerce
power. 343 Even if the commerce power reasoning articulated explicit rules that
could qualify as binding under this Article's approach, it could be argued that
they lack a sufficient nexus to the Court's ultimate decision because the scope
of the commerce power did not change the ultimate conclusion that the
3
individual mandate was constitutional. 44 Alternative holdings-where a court
decides multiple issues, either one of which would compel the court's ultimate

Abramowicz & Stearns, supra note 7, at 984-85 (using Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke to
illustrate biconditionals problem).
133 Abramowicz & Steams, supra note 7, at 1038; see also id. at 984-85.
340 Even if one accepts that both halves of a biconditional statement would be binding
when the biconditional is accepted by a majority of the precedent-setting court, the rules
governing the stare decisis effect of non-majority opinions may lead to only one half of a
biconditional statement being established. See supra note 315 and accompanying text.
341 See Steinman, supra note 13, at 1802.
342 567 U.S. 519, 588 (2012).
343 See Steinman, supra note 13, at 1744-45 (describing breakdown of Justices' votes in
NFIB).
3" See id. Whether NFIB generates any binding case law regarding the Commerce Clause
is further complicated by the fact that the five-Justice "majority" on the Commerce Clause
issue included the four dissenting Justices. See id. at 1745-46. Under the Marks rule, see supra
notes 305-07 and accompanying text, only the reasoning of concurring Justices can count
toward the holding.
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decision-present another variant of this problem. As a logical matter, any one
of those alternative holdings would arguably be unnecessary. 345 This Article's
framework leaves open what principles should govern these sorts of multipleissue scenanos.
A third problem is interpretive methodology. When a court chooses a
particular method for interpreting the Constitution (say, originalism) or a statute
(say, textualism), in what sense is that choice binding on future courts as a matter
of stare decisis? The conventional wisdom is that interpretive methodology is
not binding. 346 This view is in tension, however, with the Supreme Court's view
that stare decisis requires future courts to follow the "rationale upon which" a
precedent-setting decision was "based." 347 Interpretive methodology would
surely seem to qualify as part of a court's "rationale" in deciding a particular
case.
In terms of this Article's approach, interpretive methodology would typically
be a non-syllogistic element of a court's reasoning; the methodology provides
the reason for adopting (or rejecting) a particular if-then rule. 348 On the other
hand, a principle of interpretive methodology might fit this Article's definition
of a generalizable rule that can be expressed in if-then form. For example, "if
the text of a statute is unambiguous, then courts must follow the text." 349 Rules
of interpretive methodology, however, are identifiably distinct because the sole
function of such rules is to generate some other rule that is used to decide the
issues presented in the case. This distinction would permit drawing a clear line
that would-consistently with the conventional wisdom-deny stare decisis
effect to rules of interpretive methodology. This Article does not, however, take
a position on whether stare decisis should categorically exclude principles of
interpretive methodology when those principles are stated as generalizable ifthen rules. 350

345 See id. at 1802.
346 See, e.g., Abbe R. Gluck, The States as Laboratories of Statutory Interpretation:
Methodological Consensus and the New Modified Textualism, 119 YALE L.J. 1750, 1765
(2010) ("[T]he Court does not give stare decisis effect to any statements of statutory
interpretation methodology.").
347 Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 66-67 (1996).
38 See supra Section III.A.2.
349 See, e.g., Conn. Nat'l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253-54 (1992) ("We have stated
time and again that courts must presume that a legislature says in a statute what it means and
means in a statute what it says there.").
350 See Steinman, supra note 13, at 1801 n.357 (noting that rule-based approach to stare
decisis "is flexible enough to accommodate a range of views" regarding interpretive
methodology).
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CONCLUSION

Case law is a fundamental part of the American legal system. Yet we have
lacked a clear understanding about which aspects of a judicial decision impose
prospective legal obligations as a matter of stare decisis and to what extent. This
Article has developed an approach to this puzzle that focuses on the decisional
rules that a court states explicitly and that can be framed in the form (If P, then
Q). This proposal would discard much of the conventional wisdom about stare
decisis, including constructs like the distinction between holdings and dicta; the
search for "necessary" parts of a judicial opinion; and the presumed need for
courts to reconcile their decisions with the precedent-setting court's findings,
conclusions, or reasons that are not explicitly stated as generalizable rules. An
explicit-rules approach would provide a workable conceptual framework that
serves the key goals that stare decisis ought to serve, while identifying more
clearly both the lawmaking content of any given decision and a future court's
range of permissible moves in light of that decision.

